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What is China Seeking in the UK?
  1. Chinese expertise, giving China an economic advantage. (China's use of Academia to gain economic advantage is covered in more detail in a Case Study in Part Two of the Report.)
  2. In terms of illicit acquisition, the Chinese target IP and data closely aligned with China's national strategies, including those industries identified as priorities in the 'Made in China 2025' strategy—such as IT, robotics, aerospace, ocean engineering equipment and ships, railways, energy-saving technology, vehicles, agriculture, new materials and medicine. (The last of these, medicine, has become particularly pertinent since the start of the Covid-19 pandemic.) HMG told us that the ChIS will have launched a systemic cyber effort, both increasing and diversifying its use of cyber attacks, to obtain IP, Personally Identifiable Information, ***.[1] This latter point is covered in more detail in the Case Study on Industry and Technology.
  3. China has been accused of stealing IP and data from industries in the US, with the estimated cost of Chinese cyber-enabled theft alone thought to be around $320bn to the US economy in 2018. The danger posed by Chinese illicit acquisition of data and technology—and emerging technology in particular—is discussed further in the Case Study on Industry and Technology.
  4. In the Energy sector, the Chinese government has a strategic imperative to acquire technology—through covert acquisition of IP—that will enable it to improve and increase domestic energy production. With severe pollution and environmental damage posing a possible threat to the CCP's popular support in China, there is a threat of economic espionage in the area of 'green' energy. These issues are explored in greater detail in our Case Study on Civil Nuclear energy.
  5. China's attempts to achieve economic advantage pose a pervasive threat, but certain UK sectors would appear to be of particular interest:
    • the Telecommunications sector (given that it provides access to information across other sectors);
    • the Aerospace sector;
    • key emerging technology sectors (e.g. artificial intelligence (AI), quantum and synthetic biology);
    • traditional technology sectors (e.g. trains and ocean engineering);[2]
    • Nuclear, Civil Nuclear and the wider Energy sector;[3] and
    • the economy and Academia.[4]
    (We consider these sectors in more detail later in our Case Studies on Academia, Industry and Technology, and Civil Nuclear energy.)

  1. Written evidence—***, *** September 2020; 'UK and allies hold Chinese state responsible for a pervasive pattern of hacking', www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-and-allies-hold-chinese-state-responsible-for-a-pervasive-pattern-of-hacking, 19 July 2021.
  2. Oral evidence—MI5, *** December 2020.
  3. Oral evidence—HMG, *** October 2020.
  4. Oral evidence—HMG, *** October 2020.

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