Page:ISC-China.pdf/36

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CHINA

    • suppressing threats to the CCP and its monopoly on state power—including international and domestic democracy advocates and minority groups, such as the Falun Gong and the Uighur Muslim population in Xinjiang;
    • sovereignty—particularly with regard to Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macau and Tibet; and
    • support to military operations-in addition to operations designed to ensure China's territorial integrity, this also includes monitoring US military movements in the Pacific and the military capabilities and capacity of adversaries.[1] Spying on other countries' defence industries would also fall under this category.[2]
  1. The UK Intelligence Community broadly concurs, reiterating that China's prevailing priority is maintaining the power of the CCP and the Chinese state—but that this does not mean that the ChIS have a purely domestic focus, as their remit includes both seeking to suppress the 'Five Poisons'[3] (which are regarded as threats to China's national security) and advancing China's national interests by expanding its global reach and influence. There are public indications that, over the past decade, China has been placing greater emphasis on developing stronger foreign intelligence capabilities[4]—for example, the establishment of the People's Liberation Army Strategy Support Force (PLASSF) in 2015. SIS said that, while China "are predominantly focused on internal threats", nevertheless "they have a potent external capability … they deploy globally".[5]
  2. It appears that President Xi's authority over the ChIS has grown since 2016, and that Beijing is using the ChIS as an increasingly important tool.[6] The ChIS target the UK and its interests prolifically and aggressively, with economic espionage a prominent motivation for the ChIS. We were told that there are up to *** ChIS officers usually stationed in the UK, as well as ***.[7] SIS noted that: ***[8]

  1. Hearing on China's Intelligence Services and Espionage Operations, US China Economic and Security Review Commission, 9 June 2016.
  2. For instance, ***.
  3. Taiwanese independence, Tibetan independence, Xinjiang separatists, the Falun Gong and the Chinese democracy movement.
  4. Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
  5. Oral evidence—SIS, *** July 2019.
  6. Written evidence—***, *** December 2019.
  7. Written evidence—***, *** December 2019.
  8. Oral evidence—SIS, *** July 2019.

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