CHINA
The Ministry of Public Security
- The Ministry of Public Security is responsible for domestic law enforcement, counter-terrorism, counter-espionage operations and maintaining 'social order'—including the forced repatriation of Chinese nationals—although since 2015 it has been able to carry out investigations overseas if necessary. It liaises with foreign national police services and maintains an active role in counter-narcotics and illegal immigration work.[1]
Other intelligence-gathering organisations
- The Political Work Department Liaison Bureau—part of the Central Military Commission—makes use of cover organisations to facilitate access to, and influence over, prominent figures overseas, with a particular focus on defence policy-makers.[2] It conducts operations at home and overseas, using officers posted under various covers in China and in embassies and consulates.[3]
- The United Front Work Department, one of the most important departments of the CCP, is tasked with building and maintaining support for the Party, both at home and overseas, and is therefore concerned with domestic influence and control, and influence and interference activities directed at the Chinese diaspora, from managing relations with prominent Chinese individuals and groups to co-ordinating support for Chinese positions or targeting dissident groups abroad.[4]
- The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the official diplomatic service, has access to important stakeholders within foreign governments ***.[5] The International Liaison Department is responsible for cultivating relations with foreign political parties. Its overt functions include liaison with these parties and with pro-China friendship associations and 'peace movements' overseas. ***[6]
A broad remit
- Like all intelligence services, the ChIS seek to obtain classified information regarding, for example, foreign powers' military operations, defence industries, national security decision-makers and government organisations.[7] However, the ChIS are also known to have a considerable appetite for collecting unclassified information. In 2008, MI5 had explained to the Committee:
- ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
- ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 31 May 2019.
- ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
- ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 31 May 2019; Charles Parton, 'China-UK Relations: Where to Draw the Border Between Influence and Interference', Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), 20 February 2019.
- ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 31 May 2019.
- ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 31 May 2019.
- ↑ Written evidence—HMG, April 2019.
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