Page:ISC-China.pdf/42

CHINA

1. in aggressive action is in response to actions taken by the UK, which China perceives to be aggressive: Royal Navy activity in the South China Sea *** and statements made by UK officials that challenge Chinese 'core interests'.^[1]

Case study: Targeting of British Embassy staff

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*** Due to limited extra-territorial provisions in the Official Secrets Act 1989, which extend only to UK nationals overseas, the UK Intelligence Community were unable to pursue a prosecution.^[2]

 

Using social media

75. Social media is increasingly used to identify human targets overseas and to make initial introductions.^[3] Bulk online methodology—using multiple fake profiles on social media—can be used to identify thousands of potential targets, including HMG officials, with all-expenses-paid invitations to China following.^[4] Foreign business consultants based in China are increasingly used to help Chinese state targeting by advertising on Western websites for 'consultants' or 'associates' to provide assessments on various issues: good connections to Western governments are often a prerequisite.^[5]
76. Academics are often initially approached through invitations to a conference in China, during which the academic would "have a slightly strange encounter over coffee with someone who is not quite as presented".^[6] We questioned whether the methodology always focused on trips to China and were told that:

    *** once they get you back to China, if you have shown vulnerability to them, they will absolutely do all the usual gamut of blackmail, honey-trapping, where they try and catch you in a sexually compromising position. They will do all of that.^[7]

77. The following graphic *** is useful in showing a potential pathway through which online cultivation may take place, and where the approaches have led to further cultivation.

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1. Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
2. Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
3. We note the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure's public Think Before You Link campaign. ('Think Before You Link (TBYL)', www.cpni.gov.uk/security-campaigns/think-you-link-tby1-0, 30 September 2021.)
4. Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
5. Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
6. Oral evidence—MI5, *** July 2019.
7. Oral evidence—SIS, *** October 2020.

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