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CHINA

  1. The Sanya Initiative provided a key opportunity to do so. It was a military-to-military discussion forum organised by the CAIFC, often cited as a front organisation for the Political Work Department Liaison Bureau, an intelligence and political interference bureau of the Central Military Commission. Meetings took place between the US and China from 2008 to 2010, and between the UK and China from 2011 to 2013.[1] ***.
  2. The Sanya Initiative would appear to have been an influence operation run by the ChIS, focused on targeting and co-opting senior officials and military personnel to support Chinese aims ***. *** they serve as an example of China’s willingness to blend overt and covert activity in an attempt to influence and interfere.[2]
  3. There are also concerns that China is recruiting former UK military personnel. The motivation appears to be to gain operational advantage (as opposed to employing them for the explicit purpose of interference). However, the possibility remains that former UK Armed Forces personnel could be utilised as part of a wider interference operation. We questioned DI about this threat, and the Chief of Defence Intelligence (CDI) told us:

    I am very concerned in the defence space about particularly former military personnel being employed by China. So there’s been an active campaign by the Chinese to recruit pilots[3] ***[4]

  4. Former UK military personnel are attractive to the Chinese as a way to improve their understanding of how Western planes and pilots operate. We were told that, although China had made advanced technological equipment available to their military, the lack of Chinese experience in the field (i.e. engaged in operations) meant that they did not have the experience of using it:

    because they haven't been in combat, [that] means that they haven't learnt many of the lessons that the West has learnt and other nations over recent military operations. So therefore they're trying to not only short-circuit their R&D [research and development] through stealing secrets, but they're also trying to short-circuit their … operational development by attracting Western personnel.[5]

    When we questioned what could be done, we were told:

    we're looking at options that we have ***[6]

Interference in elections
  1. In recent years, there has been significant coverage of state actors attempting to interfere in Western democratic elections. In the previous Committee's Russia Report, it was noted that the UK is "clearly a target for Russian disinformation campaigns and

  1. Open source reporting indicates that the US–China meetings have resumed in recent years.
  2. Written evidence—HMG, 21 January 2020; 12 February 2020.
  3. We note that the UK issued an intelligence alert to warn UK Armed Forces pilots against working for the Chinese military, in October 2022 (after evidence-taking had concluded for this Inquiry).
  4. Oral evidence—DI, *** December 2020.
  5. Oral evidence—DI, *** December 2020.
  6. Oral evidence—DI, *** December 2020

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