CHINA
- interference in elections than Australia or New Zealand because the ethnic Chinese population, particularly from the People's Republic of China (as opposed to Taiwan or Hong Kong), is relatively small.[1]
- There is, however, a harder edge to China's interest in its citizens overseas. The UK's tradition of political tolerance has meant that many foreign dissidents have made their homes here over the years and this has often prompted the hostile interest of foreign intelligence services. This is particularly true also in the case of China, given its focus on muting criticism of the CCP and dissuading challenge to China's territorial claims.
- The Chinese Ministry of Public Security (MPS) plays a key role in pursuing what China calls 'economic fugitives' (who are in fact more likely to be high-profile opposition figures) across the world, including in the UK. This global campaign to track down and repatriate individuals accused of corruption is known as Operation FOXHUNT. China is known to have repatriated Chinese nationals allegedly involved in corruption from the UK and conducted coerced repatriations of economic fugitives from the UK and kidnapping of dual nationals overseas.[2] ***.[3]
- The MPS and other official bodies involved in FOXHUNT will typically 'persuade' the fugitive to return either by telephone calls or by visiting their place of residence abroad. The MPS also indirectly coerces fugitives by applying pressure on friends and family in China, for instance by suspending people from their jobs, withholding pension payments, physical threats and imprisonment, and by coercing them into visiting the fugitive abroad. ***.[4]
- The Home Office has been seeking to understand and respond to the threat posed by FOXHUNT. During our Russia Inquiry, we were assured that all figures at risk—Russian or otherwise—received protection according to the level of risk, which is police-led. We investigated the provisions in place to respond to such action from the ChIS as part of this Inquiry. ***. In evidence to the Committee, MI5 noted that ***.[5]
- When we asked why ***, we were told that: ***[6]
- ***[7]
K. In terms of interference, China oversteps the boundary and crosses the line from exerting influence—a legitimate course of action—into interference, in the pursuit of its interests and values at the expense of those of the UK.
- ↑ Oral evidence—Charles Parton (RUSI), 9 May 2019
- ↑ Written evidence—JIO, 17 November 2016; 30 November 2016
- ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
- ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
- ↑ Oral evidence—HMG, *** July 2019
- ↑ Oral evidence—HMG, *** July 2019.
- ↑ Written evidence—MI5, 24 September 2020.
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