Page:ISC-China.pdf/69

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The 'Strategy': Frameworks, Plans and Pillars
  1. "the export control regime where specific consideration to new definitions of dual-use and emerging technology require consideration" and "an uplift to the investment screening capability to better monitor and scrutinise transactions, including those from China".[1]
  2. Upon publication of the NSI Bill in November 2020, it was apparent that the Economic Threats Unit in the Cabinet Office was instead to be a new Investment Security Unit (ISU) in the (then) Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS). However, there has been no indication that the ISU will carry out the proposed role to look "upstream and understand the aggressive intent behind some of the investment in the UK and therefore pre-empt it".[2]
  3. During the passage of the NSI Bill, we sought assurances about the oversight of the ISU. We were informed that, despite the Unit relying on classified information, oversight would be undertaken by the BEIS Select Committee. However, such oversight can only be undertaken by the ISC—as the only Committee of Parliament with regular access to classified information, and to which the UK Intelligence Community have a statutory duty to provide information.[3] We discuss this further in our Case Study on Industry and Technology.
  4. Project DEFEND was established as a result of difficulties experienced during the initial response to the pandemic. It focused on identifying vulnerabilities in the UK global supply chain and assessing threats to the supply of critical goods into the UK, "to better safeguard critical supply chains. This includes diversification, greater HMG oversight of the procurement process and improved contingency planning."[4] In October 2020, the Deputy National Security Adviser (DNSA) explained:

    Covid has very sharply brought into relief the need to look at … CNI [Critical National Infrastructure] the supply chain, emerging technologies, critical suppliers to government, across the range and make some judgements about what we are, what we need to have sovereign, what we are prepared to work with trusted partners on and what we are prepared to leave to the global market … the Department for International Trade is leading a very large project called Project DEFEND that very specifically looks to interrogate the security of our supply chains across the board ***.[5]

  5. While economic security is now more of a focus at policy level, it is important that the shift in focus to securing the UK's economic resilience is mirrored at an operational level ***.[6] One example of this is the investigation of the implications of a Chinese aerospace company's (***) move to purchase a UK Low Earth Orbit satellite company, OneWeb. This is explored further in our Case Study on Industry and Technology.

  1. Written evidence—HMG, 14 September 2020.
  2. Oral evidence—HMG, *** October 2020.
  3. Since evidence-taking for this Inquiry concluded, the ISU has been transferred back to the Cabinet Office, following the restructure of several government departments (including BEIS) announced in February 2023.
  4. Written evidence—HMG, 14 September 2020.
  5. Oral evidence—NSS, *** October 2020.
  6. ***

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