Page:ISC-China.pdf/82

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CHINA

    • This is a decrease from 2019, when *** FTE staff worked on China. In 2019, the Committee was told that *** due to be recruited, which would raise the number of dedicated staff to *** FTE.[1] Then in 2020, we were informed that the figure "will rise to *** FTE ***."[2] At the time of taking evidence, we had yet to receive confirmation that this uplift had taken place.
  1. NSS has *** staff[3] working on China with an administrative spend of £*** per annum. This includes a secretariat for the China National Security Council (NSC) strategy and National Strategy Implementation Group (NSIG), co-ordination of cross-cutting policy in support of that strategy, and provision of advice to the Prime Minister.
Potential for increase in resourcing
  1. When we took evidence in autumn 2019, the Intelligence Community told us that any increase in resources on China would have to be viewed as necessary by the NSC (and the Treasury) and it may be that the threat posed by Russia, Iran or counter-terrorism could be considered as more in need of increased resourcing. In the past, such balancing of priorities has seen resources being diverted away from China onto acute counter-terrorism priorities. As Director General MI5 explained to the Committee:

    *** there are some difficult choices when the CT [counter-terrorism] thing has not reduced in its scale and its sharpness... we need to figure out how much of these kinds of capabilities feels enough or proportionate against this threat.[4]

  2. MI5 told the Committee that there were things that the Government could invest in that would improve overall defences (against HSA). But, if the NSC decided that a new area was of great ***.[5] GCHQ told the Committee that it was investing in training people to work on China *** but that, in terms of analytical effort, difficult decisions would have to be made in order to balance it alongside work on other areas ***.[6]
  3. In 2019, the SRO for China was clear that there was "a big set of questions for a Spending Review" where the China effort was concerned.[7] The Agencies explained that they had submitted ambitious bids to the 2020 Spending Review but that there would be difficult decisions. According to MI5 ***[8] SIS echoed this, and also noted that despite increased focus on China ***.[9]
  4. We were concerned in particular at the *** in Homeland Security Group working on China, but welcomed the expected increase in resourcing across the Intelligence Community. We expected to see resourcing of the upward trajectory maintained in the Spending Review,

  1. Written evidence—OSCT, 14 June 2019.
  2. Written evidence—OSCT, 28 February 2020.
  3. The Cabinet Office notes that its China team draws on China expertise from across Whitehall and that the majority of HMG work on China is done in other government departments. (Written evidence—HMG, 18 November 2020.)
  4. Oral evidence—MI5, *** July 2019.
  5. Oral evidence—MI5, *** July 2019.
  6. Oral evidence—GCHQ, *** July 2019.
  7. Oral evidence—*** July 2019.
  8. Oral evidence—MI5, *** October 2020.
  9. Oral evidence—SIS, *** October 2020.

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