Page:ISC-China.pdf/89

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Defending the UK
      • producing guidance to help in sector-specific technologies; and
      • working with key vendors to better secure their supply chains.[1]
A new approach
  1. In June 2019, MI5 told the Committee that, instead of relying on uncovering HSA through investigations, in future it will place greater emphasis on making sure that the UK is a difficult operating environment for hostile state actors. ***.[2]
  2. MI5 updated the Committee on this work in late 2020, saying that it believed its record over the past year was "***" in that it had ***.[3] The Director General told the Committee:

    There is some good work happening, which is informing a range of policy action, and one recent example would be ***. That work has in part been stimulated by some very good analysis and assessment work which has brought together that picture.[4]

  3. However, the fact remains that there have been no prosecutions and only one arrest of a ***. This is partly down to the difficulty in prosecuting espionage offences (discussed further in the chapter on Legislation) as Director General MI5 explained:

    *** more often it is information that confers a UK advantage but isn't necessarily a … state official secret, which is one of the reasons why the proposed new legislation is something that we see advantage in.[5]

CC. MI5 is responsible for countering Hostile State Activity, and the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure and the National Cyber Security Centre play a key role in engaging with those within and outside government to protect national security. There is a wide array of defensive tools, which are being used to good effect, but the Government has come late to the party and has a lot of catching up to do. Our closest allies identified the need to use such tools against China long ago and we must learn from their experience and knowledge.

DD. It is also clear that this defensive effort requires a cross-government approach. However, this transfer of responsibility will need to be a well-thought-out, gradual process with adequate support provided to the departments and some degree of control retained at the centre. HMG needs to ensure that those departments not traditionally associated with security are properly resourced with security expertise, properly supported and properly scrutinised.

Challenges in tackling Chinese spying
Lack of Chinese Intelligence Services action in the UK
  1. ***

  1. Oral evidence—NCSC, *** October 2020.
  2. Written evidence—MI5, 12 June 2019.
  3. Oral evidence—MI5, *** October 2020.
  4. Oral evidence—MI5, *** October 2020.
  5. Oral evidence—MI5, *** December 2020.

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