- As has been mentioned previously, the ChIS also target unclassified UK material—an act which (in many circumstances) would not be an offence in UK law. This activity may be more difficult to detect and counter, although the Committee notes that this was an area being looked at by the (then) Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, and the Home Office, including through possible legislation.
EE. Chinese law now requires its citizens to provide assistance to the Chinese Intelligence Services (ChIS) and to protect state secrets. It is highly likely that the ChIS will use such legislation to compel the Chinese staff of UK companies to co-operate with them. It is also likely that China's Personal Information Protection Law will lead to the Chinese government forcing Chinese and other companies to turn over their data held on Chinese citizens. As compartmentalisation of Chinese citizens' data will be difficult, this is likely to mean that, in practice, China will obtain access to data held on non-Chinese citizens as well.
- Much of the impact that China has on national security is overt—through its economic might, its takeovers and mergers, its interaction with Academia and Industry—as opposed to covert activity carried out by its intelligence officers ***. This means that 'interference' operations can be less easy to point to than traditional 'spying' operations ***.
- The UK Intelligence Community have been open with the Committee about the challenges of detecting Chinese interference operations:
China's blended approach—its intertwining of overt and covert activity—poses significant challenges. ***. Unpicking this is difficult.[1]
- The JIC Chair acknowledged that "*** some of it is legitimate activity, some of it … [is not] legitimate but not necessarily illegal".[2] MI5 clarified the role that the UK Intelligence Community plays in identifying Chinese interference operations:
*** A lot of that will be visible, open, what I think diplomacy is about, that fostering of understanding, but we worry about where it is more covert or more nefarious.[3]
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