- Since the Committee began taking evidence and questioning the Agencies on their lack of involvement in tackling overt aspects of the Chinese threat, there appears to have been a change in approach. ***[1], ***.[2]
- MI5 told us that this decision was part of a "gradual widening of our aperture" to look beyond the traditional focus ***.[3] This allowed it to increase its work on influence alongside espionage. MI5 says that it is exploring ***.[4]
- In October 2020, the Acting National Security Adviser (NSA) told the Committee that there was now "an enormous amount of work underway, and of course it is not perfect at the moment, but it shows, I think, that we are joining up more effectively across government and between the covert side and the overt side, to get our arms around the scale of the threat".[5] Director GCHQ also told us that the situation was improving. However, the Director also noted that there was a tension between centralising the response and empowering the lead government department to address the issue (which had, in the past, resulted in a lack of co-ordination).[6]
- In December 2020, the DNSA acknowledged that neither the (then) Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) nor the (then) Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) was yet able to engage fully in national security decision-making structures:
The one area probably of vulnerability at the moment, both for BEIS and for DCMS in handling some of their cases is their security expertise, their capabilities, their infrastructure one of the reasons we have incubated the Economic Threats Unit/Investment Security Unit in the Cabinet Office is because we have that very rich relationship and can do that kind of intelligence component. So the reason we haven't sort of chucked it straight over the fence is that we are trying to give BEIS some time to build that capability. They have just appointed a new security Director and that work is ongoing and we will support them with that. But I think it's important that we support and enable them rather than continue to hold everything at the centre, in the same way as the Department of Transport would run aviation security and have that connectivity into [MI5]. Similarly with BEIS on investment security, we have to help them to be able to run this themselves.[7]
- This is clearly a time of significant change within the national security structures across the Government. Whilst we are supportive of the notion of making every part of the
- ↑ The United Front Work Department (UFWD) is an arm of the CCP, which has a remit to engage in operational activity with in China and overseas with the purpose of ensuring that potential critics and threats to the CCP are influenced, co-opted or coerced into silence. UFWD's remit includes engaging in political influence and interference operations overseas, to ensure that politicians and high-profile figures in foreign states are supportive of the CCP, or at the very least do not criticise China or counter its narrative.
- ↑ Written evidence—MI5, 24 September 2020.
- ↑ Oral evidence—MI5, *** October 2020.
- ↑ Written evidence—MI5, 24 September 2020.
- ↑ Oral evidence—*** October 2020.
- ↑ Oral evidence—GCHQ, *** October 2020.
- ↑ Oral evidence—*** December 2020.
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