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MI5

66. MI5's remit – as set out in the Security Service Act 1989 – is the "protection of national security and, in particular, its protection against threats from espionage, terrorism and sabotage, from the activities of agents of foreign powers and from actions intended to overthrow or undermine parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means".[1] MI5 states its objectives in this area as being to "seek to find those trying to pass sensitive UK information and equipment to other countries and ensure they don't succeed" and to "investigate and disrupt the actions of foreign intelligence officers where these are damaging to our country's interests".[2]

67. Twenty years ago, MI5 devoted around 20% of its effort to Hostile State Activity, which includes Russian activity alongside the hostile activity of other states, such as China and Iran.[3] This allocation of effort declined, as the terrorist threat grew. By 2001/02, it had reduced to 16% and by 2003/04 to 10.7%. This fall continued until, by 2008/09, only 3% of effort was allocated by MI5 to all its work against Hostile State Activity (noting that reductions in proportion of overall effort do not translate directly into changes in resource).[4] It was not until 2013/14 that effort began to increase significantly, rising to 14.5%[5] – a level that MI5 says meant that slightly more staff were working on Russia than had been during the Cold War.[6] The past two years have seen ***: currently, ***% is allocated to Hostile State Activity, approximately *** which is dedicated to countering Russian Hostile State Activity.[7]

SIS and GCHQ

68. SIS is the UK's foreign human intelligence (HUMINT) agency, with a "global covert capability"[8] focusing on intelligence gathering. Areas of intelligence coverage work that SIS undertakes in relation to Russia include cultivating agents who are in a position to pass on secret information, particularly in relation to the capabilities and intent of the Russian government, and its intelligence effects work includes ***. In 2001, SIS's operational effort against Russia was ***%. This declined to ***% in 2007. It only began to increase significantly in *** and currently stands at approximately ***%.[9]

69. GCHQ is the UK's signals intelligence (SIGINT) agency – also focusing on intelligence gathering.[10] GCHQ's intelligence effects work primarily comprises Offensive Cyber. Areas of intelligence coverage work that GCHQ undertakes include: applying selectors to emails obtained by bulk interception; targeted interception of the phone calls of


  1. Section 1(2) of the Security Service Act 1989.
  2. www.mi5.gov.uk/espionage
  3. Written evidence – MI5, 31 October 2018.
  4. Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament Annual Reports: 2001–2002, Cm 5542; 2003–2004, Cm 6240; 2008–2009, Cm 7807.
  5. Written evidence – MI5, 31 October 2018.
  6. Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament Annual Report 2016–2017, HC 655.
  7. Written evidence – MI5, 12 March 2019; MI5's overall resource has increased significantly over this period. *** allocation of effort on Hostile State Activity has ***, spending on Hostile State Activity has ***. This operational effort also benefits from the support of corporate and 'enabling' services across MI5 (which is not reflected in these figures).
  8. www.sis.gov.uk
  9. Written evidence – SIS, 17 December 2018.
  10. SIGINT is intelligence gathering through the interception of communications between people, and through the interception of other electronic signals.

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