92. As already noted, the Russian government is an accomplished adversary with well-resourced and world-class offensive and defensive intelligence capabilities. The well-publicised mistakes Russian operatives made in Salisbury, and later in trying to infiltrate the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), have led to public speculation about the competence of the Russian Intelligence Services (RIS), and the GRU in particular. Whilst these attacks demonstrate that the RIS are not infallible, it would be foolhardy to think that they are any less dangerous because of these mistakes. Indeed, the likelihood is that the RIS will learn from their errors, and become more difficult to detect and protect against as a result.
93. All witnesses agreed that Russia is one of the hardest intelligence challenges that there is. There are a number of reasons for this. While some are generic problems that are heightened by Russian ability to exploit them (for example, ***), others are unique to Russia (for example, ***).
94. The Russian decision-making apparatus is concentrated on Putin and a small group of trusted and secretive advisers (many of whom share Putin's background in the RIS). The limited number of individuals who are 'in the know' makes decision-making hard to understand, compared with systems where power and influence are dispersed among a great number of political players. Moreover, the President can make swift decisions that even his inner circle are not aware of – further complicating any ability to understand or predict Russian government intent.
95. This centralised decision-making allows the Russian government to carry out decisions at speed. Putin's inner circle appear to be willing and able to make and enact major decisions (for example, on the deployment of troops) within days, and they retain tight command and control over the whole government infrastructure – which can be put in the service of Russia's foreign policy goals at a moment's notice. It is difficult for the UK's democratic and consensus-based structures to match this pace. Putin appears to value surprise and the unexpected, and has therefore consciously retained and cultivated this 'decision-advantage' as a way of outmanoeuvring adversaries.
96. It is not clear to the Committee whether HMG and our allies have yet found an effective way to respond to the pace of Russian decision-making. This has severely undermined the West's ability to respond effectively to Russian aggressions in the past – for example, the annexation of Crimea in 2014.[1] By contrast, the pace of the response to the Salisbury attack was impressive. However, ***: a way must be found to maintain this momentum across Government.
97. Advancements in technology and data analytics present a range of challenges for all of the organisations the Committee oversees. In relation to signals intelligence (SIGINT),
- ↑ This is, partly, a result of the inherent differences between Russian and Western political systems.
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