104. Russia is a particularly hard operating environment for other countries' intelligence officers, so ***.[1] ***.[2] As a result, HUMINT opportunities need to be sought elsewhere. This may be ***.[3]
105. Due to the difficulties in finding and operating HUMINT sources on Russia, the Intelligence Community rely on the "bringing together of a range of intelligence disciplines" in order to get the best possible picture of the Russian threat.[4] In relation to SIGINT, GCHQ has focused on not only deploying a broad range of capabilities against Russia, but in joining up with others to use their capabilities in tandem, allowing them to ***.
106. Defence Intelligence brings to the table a range of specialised geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) and measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) capabilities, which can be used to observe Russian targets at a distance, with a focus on military capabilities and organisations. Defence Intelligence has sought to *** "try to understand how they think and why they think".[5] Defence Intelligence is also involved in the expansion of HMG's open source intelligence capabilities (i.e. the analysis of information that can be accessed freely on the internet, or bought through commercial providers) through the Defence Intelligence Open Source Hub. Analysis of open source information is being increasingly used by the Agencies and Defence Intelligence to enhance their overall situational awareness, and can be fused with a smaller proportion of secret intelligence to provide a richer picture.
107. The Committee was struck by the relatively small proportion of *** work that is carried out by the Agencies in relation to Russia, compared with the intelligence coverage of Russia that is undertaken. For example, SIS usually deploys only *** of its overall operational Russia effort in support of ***, whilst GCHQ uses approximately ***.[6]
108. We were told that, since the overall cross-Whitehall Russia Strategy aim, in relation to Russia, is to develop "a Russia that chooses to co-operate, rather than challenge or confront", any work must be proportionate to this outcome – notably HMG does not deploy effects with the goal of effecting organisational collapse, in the way that they might be deployed against international terrorist groups, for example.[7] However, of equal concern, it appears, is the need to tread carefully so as not to provoke unexpected escalation. As a result, the Agencies' effects work primarily concentrates on ***; capability-building (the sharing of knowledge and capabilities with partners); and counter-intelligence work to disrupt *** operations.
109. We note that the focus on *** work increased significantly following the events in Salisbury as HMG *** engaged in a substantive and concerted diplomacy effort to coordinate a strong international response to the use of chemical weapons against civilians on UK soil.[8] This raises the question of whether return now to a 'normal', relatively low, level of *** effort against Russia would undermine this, or whether it would now be more
- ↑ GCHQ and Defence Intelligence staff working on Russia are UK based.
- ↑ Oral evidence – SIS, *** December 2018.
- ↑ ***
- ↑ Oral evidence – Defence Intelligence, *** December 2018.
- ↑ Oral evidence – Defence Intelligence, *** December 2018.
- ↑ Oral evidence – SIS and GCHQ, *** January 2019.
- ↑ More information on this is included in the Strategy, Co-ordination and Tasking section of this Report.
- ↑ The international response to Salisbury is discussed in more detail in the International Partnerships section of this Report.
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