Page:ISC Russia Report.pdf/45

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system", including "working very closely with NATO colleagues, putting assessments into NATO, [and] working very closely with the NATO Intelligence Fusion Cell at RAF Molesworth".[1]

Helping others to help us

131. However, some partners with whom the UK might wish to work closely do not have the requisite intelligence capacity. ***.

132. In terms of its 'near abroad', Russia clearly intends keeping these countries within its 'sphere of influence', and conducts cyber activity and pursues economic policy to that end in ***. HMG initiatives *** are therefore essential. However, we note that this is not a short-term project: continuing investment and a long-term strategy are required *** against Russian influence.

The international response to Salisbury

133. Following the GRU attack in Salisbury, the UK's goal was to respond quickly, and – understanding that Russia is not overly concerned about individual reprisal – to 'internationalise' any action against Russia by building as broad a coalition as possible.[2] The UK Government (***) embarked on a diplomacy effort to provide allies with the evidence related to the attack, and to persuade them to join the UK in taking action in the form of expulsions and strengthened sanctions.

134. As mentioned previously, the resulting expulsion of 153 Russian intelligence officers and diplomats from 29 countries and NATO was an unprecedented international response.[3] Whilst the fact that chemical weapons were used – in clear breach of international law and attracting the opprobrium of the international community – was undoubtedly a factor in persuading countries to join forces with the UK, the quick and coordinated response from *** HMG more widely, which provided evidence and reassurance to partners, made it easier for them to join in the public condemnation.

135. This diplomatic response, and the subsequent exposure of the responsible GRU agents, sent a strong message to Russia that such actions would not be tolerated, and provides a platform for the future. We were told that:

[Salisbury] has changed the dynamic … [and] there is a growing sense amongst countries who feel threatened by Russia that there is an opportunity both through intelligence and security cooperation and at a diplomatic level to deliver real-world effects against Russia and that feels quite different. That feels like a very positive outcome from what was a crisis.[4]

We recognise the amount of effort that went into achieving this and we commend all involved for their hard work.


  1. Oral evidence – Defence Intelligence, *** January 2019.
  2. ***
  3. It presents a stark comparison with HMG's slow and isolated response to Russian aggression after the murder of Alexander Litvinenko in 2006 (despite the use of a radioactive substance in that case).
  4. Oral evidence – SIS, *** December 2018. Defence Intelligence also observed that the impact of the Salisbury attack on the NATO intelligence community had "been significant in terms of bolstering individuals", noting that *** (oral evidence – Defence Intelligence, *** February 2019).

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