It contained a passage to this effect:—"I see in our relations with the Bund a calamity for Prussia, and if we do not find a cure for it while the time is favourable, it will have to be cured, sooner or later, ferro et igni. As affairs are now, I believe if the Bund were destroyed altogether it would be better for Prussia. By that mere negation she would gain better relations with the neighbouring German states." The chancellor's frank style of offering peace or threatening war was thoroughly maintained throughout his conversations with the Austrian minister, Count Karolyi, in 1862. Bismarck declared that he wanted a firm friendship on equal terms between Prussia and Austria. Nothing less would suffice. On these terms he offered to shake hands, and just as plainly he declared that the rejection of these terms must lead to warfare. In his circular of the 24th January, 1863, he says, "In order to bring about a better understanding of the two courts, I took the initiative in the form of negotiations with Count Karolyi, in which I brought important considerations under the notice of the imperial ambassador, reminding him that, during the decennial period preceding the events of 1848, there had been a tacit understanding between the two high powers, by virtue of which Austria was insured the support of Prussia on European questions, and on the other hand, allowed us to exercise an influence in Germany, unfettered by the opposition of Austria, as manifested by the formation of the Customs Union. By those arrangements, the German Diet enjoyed a degree of internal unity and outward dignity which has not since then been attained. We find in those very states with which Prussia by her geographical position is interested in maintaining special friendly relations, an opposing influence promoted by the imperial cabinet with signal results. I put it strongly to Count Karolyi, that Austria might thus perhaps win the sympathies of the governments of those states, but would estrange from herself those of Prussia, to the detriment of the common interests of the Diet. The imperial ambassador consoled himself with the certainty that, in the event of any war dangerous to Austria, the two greater powers would under any circumstances be found together again as allies. In this assumption, according to my view, there exists a dangerous error, which may perhaps not become apparent until the decisive moment, with a fatal clearness for both cabinets. The contention between the two powers in the field of German politics had been solely to the advantage of a third party, and had undermined all mutual confidence. I did not conceal from Count Karolyi, under certain circumstances, I could never advise my gracious sovereign to neutrality. Austria is free to choose whether she prefers to continue her present anti-Prussia policy, with the leverage of the coalition of the central states, or an honest union with Prussia. On my arrival in Frankfort in 1851, after circumstantial conversations with Prince Metternich, then residing at Johannisberg, I had anticipated that Austria would see the wisdom of a policy which would obtain us a position in the German Confederation, consonant with the interest of Prussia to throw all her strength into the common cause. Instead of that Austria has striven to embitter and impede our position in the German Confederation, and to force us to seek for allies in other directions. The whole treatment of Prussia by the Vienna cabinet seems to rest upon the assumption that we more than any other state are fully exposed to foreign attacks, against which we need foreign assistance, and that hence we are bound to put up with contemptuous treatment from those states from whom we expect aid. The task of a Prussian government having the interests of the royal house and the country at heart, would therefore be to prove the erroneousness of this assumption by deeds, if words and aspirations are neglected." Even the most prejudiced reader must admire the absolute frankness and thorough fairness of this statement as between equals. Unfortunately for her, equality between herself and Prussia was a position that Austria was not yet prepared to admit. The conviction had to be driven home by a rude lesson. Austria, in short, despite all dangers that might threaten the unity of Germany, was still determined to maintain her old supremacy in the Diet, and to make the Diet a means of reducing the power of Prussia. The immediate reply to this rejection of friendship was a convention ratified between Prussia and Russia, for which the Polish insurrection of 1863 afforded an opportunity. In the following summer Bismarck accompanied his sovereign to Gastein, where the emperor of Austria personally invited the king to the congress of princes at Frankfort. The congress was arranged with great external state and ceremony, and almost tempted King William to attend. But his faithful minister hastened to dissuade him from so fatal a step; and the refusal of the invitation, which he sent from Baden Baden, confounded the statecraft of the Austrian minister, and reduced the entire affair, though so splendidly arranged, to a mere futility. Austria had declined all the propositions of Prussia, which aimed essentially at a peaceable separation of Austria from the German Federation, and an alliance between Austria and a new federal union to be formed under the leadership of Prussia. To these proposals Austria replied by her act for reforming the Diet, which involved the nullification of Prussia. The scheme collapsed, owing to the simple fact that Prussia declined attending the meeting at Frankfort, a signal proof that Prussia was indispensable in any solid scheme of German confederation. It was now becoming pretty evident that a crisis of another character was imminent, not so much to be decided by weapons intellectual as by the sword. In his report on the dissolution of the chamber, Bismarck strove to educate the people, the voters at elections, in his patriotic views. "On the basis of the German federal constitution," he said, "attempts have come to light, the unmistakable object of which is to diminish the power of the Prussian state in Germany and Europe; power which forms a well-earned heritage of the glorious history of our fathers, and which the Prussian people has resolved never to allow to be alienated from it. It will be necessary under these circumstances for his majesty's subjects to give expression to the fact at the forthcoming elections, that no political difference of opinion is so deeply rooted in our country that, in the face of an attempt to bring down the independence and dignity of Prussia, the unity of the nation, and its unalterable fidelity to the governing house, can be shaken." War, therefore, was imminent, and was soon afterwards declared, not as the world expected, against Austria, but in conjunction with Austria against Denmark. What induced this alliance is not clearly known; whether Schwarzenberg considered his obligations to the Federal Diet demanded it, or whether Austria feared to lose sight of Prussia in the duchies, or, what is most probable, whether it arose from a desire to retrieve her military prestige after the campaign of 1859, is yet uncertain; but it is quite clear that Bismarck, by taking the initiative, carried Austria along with him, and the result, as all know, was the annexation of Schleswig and Holstein to Austria and Prussia. One other result of this war was to show the superiority of the Prussian needle-gun, and the benefit derived in a military point of view by the reorganization of the army. By removing the Saxon and Hanoverian troops from the duchies and substituting Prussians, Bismarck cleverly managed to retain the bitter part of the spoil, and the greater part of the glory. He was now invested with the greatest honour in the king's power to bestow, the Order of the Black Eagle, and left Prussia for Biarritz in order to recruit his health. No sooner was the Holstein question settled by the war than the old squabbles of the German federation recommenced, Austria and Prussia striving by every means for ascendancy in the Diet.
As all political acts discussed in the Diet were determined by a majority of votes, Prussia, as opposed to Austria, was invariably in a minority. The central states, or small kingdoms, duchies, and governments of central Germany, being all jealous of Prussia, were delighted to find themselves placed on an equality with her in the Diet, and in the opinion of Bismarck lost no opportunity of thwarting the views of the Prussian government by their votes and intrigues. Thus, the trials and troubles of the Prussian minister increased. He was upbraided by all sides, both friends and enemies, until on the 7th May, 1866, an event occurred which somewhat stemmed the torrent of unpopularity, and turned public opinion into another channel. About five in the afternoon on the 7th May, 1866, whilst returning from an interview with the king down the central avenue of Unter den Linden in Berlin, two shots were fired at him from behind. He turned and saw a man raise a revolver for the third, who before he could seize him fired three other shots at him at arm's length; the first shot grazed his side, and by two of the others he was struck on the right shoulder and on the rib. He fancied at the moment that the last shot was mortal, and handed the assassin to an officer of the foot guards, who was passing at the time; then went on home
