the head of a general confederation, were finally overcome. Cæsar showed himself throughout a man equal to every occasion. His most striking characteristics are his bold strategy and his fertility in resources. No danger ever appalled, no novelty ever surprised or baffled him. For every emergency he had the proper measures in readiness. Whether a bridge was to be constructed to cross the rapid Rhine, or siege and earth works, or ships, or engines of war—his ingenuity solved the problem. His eminent talents for organization controlled the greatest and the smallest things, and especially the army, which he meant to be irresistible. All this time he had his watchful eye over Rome, and noted every move of the contending parties.—Pompey had undertaken, during Cæsar's absence in Gaul, to manage affairs in the interest of the triumvirate; but this was a task he was not equal to. Irresolute and yielding, he could not repress the opposition which, since Cæsar's absence, had attempted to rescind some of his enactments, especially his agrarian law. He could not even sway the elections. Low agitators like Clodius openly dared to beard and resist him. In b.c. 56, therefore, a meeting of the triumvirs and their friends was held at Luca, where their policy for the future was fixed. Cæsar consented to assist in conferring upon Pompey and Crassus the consulship for the following year; to give to Crassus the command in the east, and to Pompey the province of Spain for five years—stipulating for himself a continuation of his command in Gaul for a like period, pay from the public treasury for the legions which he had levied without authority, and the consulship for the year b.c. 48. The appointment of consuls for the year b.c. 55 was effected with the display of force which had now become usual in contested elections. All opposition was overcome—the laws giving the triumvirs the stipulated provinces, were moved and carried by the tribune Trebonius, one of their creatures, in an assembly of the people, without the concurrence of the senate. Crassus hastened to the east, where he met, b.c. 53, with overthrow and death. Pompey caused Spain to be governed by his legates, and remained in Italy under the pretext of watching over the supply of Rome with corn. He now discovered that he had been playing the game of Cæsar, and sought by degrees to conciliate the republican party. The death of Crassus removed the only man who could have prevented a collision between Pompey and Cæsar, by throwing all his weight on one side. In b.c. 54 Pompey lost his wife Julia, Cæsar's daughter, and with her another tie that bound him to his rival. Taking advantage of the disorders in which Clodius and Milo were chief actors, he caused himself to be elected consul without a colleague. He then made his peace with the senatorial party, and initiated or supported a series of measures calculated to deprive Cæsar of his province, his army, and the chance of obtaining the consulship. M. Claudius Marcellus, consul of b.c. 57, a most violent enemy of Cæsar, moved in the senate, though without effect, that Cæsar should be recalled. The same motion was repeated in the following year by the new consul, C. Marcellus, but again defeated; for Cæsar had not only bribed the second consul, L. Æmilius Paulus, but also the tribune. Curio, who approved the motion to deprive Cæsar of his command, adding, by way of amendment, that Pompey should be dealt with in a similar manner; both should either lay down their commands at the same time, or both retain them. Nothing could be more equitable than this proposal; yet it was not what Pompey and the aristocracy wanted. It was therefore not adopted for the present. Cæsar, pending these angry discussions, did, or at least appeared to do, everything to avoid an open rupture. The senatorial party ascribed his moderation to weakness. They had been informed and eagerly believed, that Cæsar's troops were disaffected, and would desert him in a war with the constituted authorities of the state. Therefore, though the majority of the senate trembled at the prospect of civil war, and gladly embraced at last the proposal of Curio, the violent minority, Cato and Marcellus at their head, disregarded this resolution, and insisted upon Cesar's immediate and unconditional submission. Cæsar appeared to hesitate. He protested that he wished for a peaceful arrangement, he deprecated the horrors of civil war, and made a last proposal, the moderation of which creates a well-grounded doubt in his sincerity. He declared himself ready to give up Transalpine Gaul and his army, if he were allowed to retain, until he was appointed consul, the provinces of Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum, or even Illyricum alone, with two legions. Curio submitted this ultimatum to the senate in January, b.c. 49. Stormy debates followed each other for several days. At last the most violent party carried the day. The original resolution was confirmed—Cæsar was declared an enemy to his country unless he abdicated his command, and the consuls were invested with unlimited military authority. The die was cast. Cæsar had no choice but to accept the challenge of his opponents, and he did it without hesitation. The contest that now began was formidable, and it was not unequal. Pompey was in possession of the legitimate authority of the republic, the prestige of formal right was on his side, and all the resources of the empire were at his command. Cæsar appeared as an insubordinate viceroy, marching against his country to subvert the ancient order of things. The senatorial party had seven tried legions in Spain under able and experienced officers; in Italy they had the materials for ten legions; they had exclusive command of the sea, and were thus secure of easy communication on the immense battlefield over which the war was sure to extend. To this formidable army Cæsar had to oppose only nine legions, or about 50,000 foot, and a body of German cavalry; but this army was perfect in every respect, and Cæsar was its only master: whilst Pompey had to consult a great number of counsellors, whose conflicting wishes and opinions added to his natural hesitation. Cæsar received the news of the declaration of war at the head of only one legion of 5000 men and 300 horse. The remainder of his army was stationed in the north of Gaul. In consequence of the procrastination and supineness of Pompey, the senatorial party had scarcely begun to organize their forces. Cæsar, therefore, determined not to wait for the remainder of his troops, but with his natural boldness, bordering upon temerity, he rushed upon his enemies at once. The most complete success rewarded him. He crossed the small river Rubicon, which separated Cisalpine Gaul from Italy, and in rapid succession took one city after another on his march along the Adriatic. The troops and officers of Pompey were terror-struck, and dispersed at his approach. All the aristocratical leaders fled, and threatened with terrible vengeance those who should venture to remain and to make their peace with Cæsar. From Capua, where he had collected his forces, Pompey marched direct to Brundisium; for Italy was already lost, and he was obliged to secure a port to effect his retreat to Greece. Half of his army was already despatched when Cæsar arrived before the place and immediately began to blockade it, and to throw earthworks across the mouth of the harbour. But Pompey had the command of the sea he baffled Cæsar's plans, embarked his remaining troops, and escaped with a trifling loss across the Adriatic. The want of a fleet prevented Cæsar from following. He was, therefore, obliged for the present to content himself with the conquest of Italy, which he had accomplished in two months. Turning to Rome, where he remained but a short time, he set out for Spain. On his way he laid siege to Massilia, a town strongly attached to the aristocratical party; but as it held out with great obstinacy, Cæsar left the siege to his lieutenants, and led his army across the Pyrenees. He met the Pompeian generals north of the Ebro, and after considerable difficulty defeated them. He generally pardoned his prisoners. This success decided the campaign in Spain. Varro and the remaining troops capitulated, and many of the Pompeian soldiers took service under Cæsar. When Cæsar arrived again before Massilia the inhabitants surrendered at discretion, and received at his hands that merciful treatment by which he knew so well to conciliate his enemies.
Cæsar now returned to Rome (autumn 49). He had caused himself to be nominated dictator, and as such, enacted a series of legislative measures, regulating the laws of debtors, giving the Roman franchise to the inhabitants of his old province of Gallia Cisalpina, and restoring to civil rights the sons of the victims of the Sullanic proscriptions. Having accomplished this, and having presided over the election of consuls for the following year, he devoted the remainder of the year to preparations for the coming campaign. Hitherto he had been eminently successful. The only reverses that checkered his career of victory, he suffered through his subordinate officers. One of them, Curio, had succeeded in taking possession of Sicily; but he had crossed over into Africa, and there lost his life and army in a battle against the Pompeians and King Juba of Numidia: another, C. Antonius, after the loss of his ships, was blockaded in the island of Curicta in the Adriatic, and made prisoner with his whole force. Pompey had made good use of his time. He had raised a very considerable army, and accumulated supplies in Dyrrhachium and other places. About 200 of the senators, the
