possible to estimate the new role of the banks. If a bank negotiates a bill for an industrial firm, opens a current account for it, etc., these operations, separately considered, by no means diminish the independence of the industrial firm, and the bank plays no other part than that of a modest intermediary. But when such operations are multiplied and become continuous, when the bank "collects" in its hands enormous sums of capital, when the running of a current account for the firm in question enables the bank—and this is what happens—to become better and better informed of the economic position of the client, then the result is a more and more complete dependence of industrial capital directly on the bank.
Parallel with this process there is being developed a very close personal connection between the banks and the biggest industrial and commercial enterprises, the fusing of one with another through the acquisition of shares, through the entry of bank directors into the boards of management of industrial and commercial enterprises, and vice versa.
The German economist, Jeidels, has compiled very complete data on this form of concentration of capitals and enterprises. Six of the biggest Berlin banks were represented by their directors in 344 industrial companies; and by their managers in 407 other companies. Altogether, they supervised a total of 751 companies. In 289 of these they had either two representatives on the board of directors, or the presidency of the Board. Amongst these industrial and commercial companies, the most varied kinds of undertaking are represented: insurance, transport, restaurants, theatres, artistic production, etc. On the other
