have been plundered; if by a majority of people, the state
rights retained, might have been invaded. The first would
have erected an aristocracy, by making a majority of states
and a minority of people, masters of the majority of the people of the United States. The second would be the case of
a minority of the strongest men joining together after
forming a society, to compel a majority of weaker men, to
submit to such alterations as they chose to make. The
destruction of popular government, was not the motive for
the confederation. The federal and popular expressions
abounding in the constitution, prove it to be a compact, both
federal and popular, requiring the happy expedient of securing a concurrence both of the federal and popular will, to
amendments for self preservation; had popular will dictated these amendments, state self government, the federal ingredient of the constitution, would have been destroyed; and
had federal will dictated them, national self government,
the popular ingredient of the constitution, would have been
also destroyed.
But if the senate are not responsible to the publick will through the medium of the states, they may defeat by less than a majority, the united will of three-fourths of the states, and a majority of the people, to amend the constitution; and drive them to the resource of calling a convention; the result of which any one state may refuse to concur in, because then each state will resume its original right to refuse or consent, as being independent of each other in negociating the terms of a new union. The concession by each state of this independency to three-fourths, suffices to shew, that a majority of states had no claim over the rights of each state, except from concession; and that each state might annex such terms to its concession, as it pleased. A power over the independence of each, is by each conceded to three-fourths. A quadruple alliance might, upon the same principles, be made amendable by three of the parties.
