Page:Interim Staff Report on Investigation into Risky MPXV Experiment at the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases.pdf/13

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.

Academies of Science, Medicine, and Engineering issued a consensus study report that noted the future risk posed by the proliferation of synthetic biology and gene editing technology:

While construction of orthopoxvirus from scratch is now possible, the committee estimated that the number of labs capable of carrying out such work is limited to perhaps less than 100 globally. The committee expects this number to increase over the next two decades as DNA synthesis and genome construction techniques improve dramatically. Moreover, the modification of an existing orthopoxvirus to increase virulence has long been possible.[1]

The Experiment

According to the NIH, the experiment at issue is a project on MPXV virus enhancement planned and/or conducted at NIAID. The NIH project number that includes this experiment is Poxvirus Host Interactions, pathogenesis and immunity, 1ZIAAI000979. The Principal Investigator of this project is Dr. Bernard Moss of NIAID.[2]

The project involves transferring genes from clade I or Congo Basin clade MPXV (a rare version of MPXV that is 1,000 times more lethal in mice than the version currently circulating in the United States) into clade II or West African clade MPXV (the version currently circulating in the United States). Clade I MPXV is lethal to more than 10 percent of unvaccinated humans while clade II MPXV is much more transmissible.[3]


    Moss team mpox study published in 2023 underwent NIH IBC review for dual-use, it is unclear what is NIH policy for reviewing mpox for DURC. Majority Committee staff requests to NIH on these issues remain unanswered.

  1. Nat’l Academies of Sciences, Engineering, & Medicine, Future State of Smallpox Medical Countermeasures (2024), https://doi.org/10.17226/27652.
  2. NIH RePORTER, Project Details, Poxvirus Host Interactions, Pathogenesis and Immunity, https://reporter.nih.gov/search/Dm7t3Wqn0k-MLTGNZf3t2g/project-details/10482754. The specific experiments to transfer genes from clade 2 monkeypox to clade 1 monkeypox virus are not mentioned in the abstract, being one of many specific experiments being performed in a large project with a 30-line project summary.
  3. Christina L. Hutson, et al., Dosage Comparison of Congo Basin and West African Strains of Monkeypox Virus using a Prairie Dog Animal Model of Systemic Orthopoxvirus Disease, 402 Virology 72–82 (2010), https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0042682210001650?via%3Dihub.

13