- the rigorous review process described in this letter before it could be initiated.” [Bold added for emphasis].Analysis of the accuracy of the HHS response: This statement is materially misleading.The study in question was included in a submission to the NIH IBC in June 2015. In 2015, during the GOF research pause, the only pathogen research undergoing the rigorous review referenced in the April 26, 2023, response were projects involving influenza, SARS, and MERS. Dr. Moss’s MPXV project was not subjected to rigorous review because it predated the HHS P3CO framework that was announced in December 2017. Finally, HHS’s April 26, 2023, letter stated that “the NIH Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) formally reviews any NIH intramural research […].” [Bold added for emphasis]. This is an acknowledgement by HHS that an IBC review is a formal process. There was no evidence in the documents that there was any referral of the research project to be reviewed for dual-use research concerns.
- “One approach to studying mpox clade differences was proposed and approved in 2015 and involves the generation of chimeric viruses—viruses that incorporate genes from two mpox strains. This ongoing sub-project includes only chimeric viruses created by replacing genes in the more virulent clade 1 virus with genes from the less virulent clade IIa virus.” [Bold added for emphasis].Analysis of the accuracy of the HHS response: The statement makes a material omission.The letter omits the fact that the approved proposal to study MPXV clade differences was bidirectional, not just replacing genes in the clade I virus with genes from the clade II virus but also transferring genes from the clade I virus into the clade II virus. This is a material omission because, earlier in the letter, NIAID continued to deny that gene transfers from the clade I virus into the clade II virus had been formally proposed and approved. As written, the statement was clearly intended to leave the inaccurate impression that the only gene transfer experiments proposed and approved were replacing genes in the clade I virus with genes from the clade II virus, which would be expected to yield either no gain in function or a loss in function for the resulting chimeric virus.
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