The doctrine originates from the Supreme Court’s unanimous but unelaborated observation that “no reporter has or can have any copyright in the written opinions delivered by this Court.” Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 668 (1834). The Supreme Court further developed the doctrine over 50 years later, holding that an official state court reporter could not claim copyright in either judges’ opinions or nonbinding explanatory materials authored by the judges. See generally Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244 (1888). In so holding, the Supreme Court stated that “[t]he whole work done by the judges constitutes the authentic exposition and interpretation of the law, which, binding every citizen, is free for publication to all.” Id. at 253. But in a companion case the same year, the Supreme Court held that an official reporter could hold a copyright in explanatory materials authored by himself, rather than the judges. See Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617 (1888). While these cases established that some government edicts could not be copyrighted, the rationale underlying their holdings was not altogether clear.
The Supreme Court recently clarified the principles animating the Government Edicts doctrine in Georgia v.
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