required but not sufficient. In addition, a court must satisfy itself that application of the doctrine is fair.” Bear, Stearns & Co. v. 1109580 Ontario, Inc., 409 F.3d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 2005). District courts have broad discretion to determine when this doctrine should be applied. See Frydman v. Akerman, 280 F. Supp. 3d 418, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
Defendants claim that ICC is SBCCI’s privy and that it is effectively relitigating the same issues that SBCCI raised in Veeck. This argument is flawed in multiple ways. First, ICC is not in privity with SBCCI in the specific manner required for collateral estoppel to be appropriate. In the context of collateral estoppel, privity between preceding and succeeding owners of property extends only to the particular property that was the subject of the prior adjudication. See Int’l Nutrition Co. v. Horphag Research, Ltd., 220 F.3d 1325, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[W]hen one party is a successor in interest to another with respect to particular property, the parties are in privity only with respect to an adjudication of rights in the property that was transferred; they are not in privity for other purposes, such as an adjudication of rights in other property that was never transferred between the two.”); see also Feldberg v. Quechee Lakes Corp., 196 F. App’x 38, 40
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