SECRET
UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33608-7001
FIRST ENDORSEMENT on Rear Admiral Fogarty's ltr of 28 July 1988
| From: | Commander in Chief, United States Central Command |
| To: | Secretary Of Defense |
| Via: | Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff |
| Subj: | FORMAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE DOWNING OF IRAN AIR FLIGHT 655 ON 3 JULY 1988 (U) |
1.(U) Readdressed and forwarded.
2.(U) The proceedings of the investigation and findings of fact are approved. The opinions and recommendations are approved except as noted below.
U
a. Opinions. (S) Opinion E.1: Approved with the qualification that regardless of the validity of early identification by the Ships's Signal Exploitation Space (SSES), the Identification Supervisor (IDS) identified the aircraft as "mode II-1100, breaks as F-14," and the aircraft was entered into the system as an F-14, thus forming a positive, authoritative identification.
Rationale: SSES denied making the report and IDS confirmed his identification.
b. Recommendations:
(1) (U) Recommendation A.1: Disapproved.
Rationale: See paragraph 4.b.
U
(2) (S) Recommendation A. 2: Approved with the additional suggestion that the Chief of Naval Operations consider instituting a program for Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence (C3I) stress management to test and evaluate the impact of human stress on C3I operations in complex modern warships such as the AEGIS Cruiser. Integral to this program would be the incorporation of measures of human effectiveness into battle simulation techniques to assess the effect of peak overloads and stress on the human players.
Rationale: High level of responsibility and stress associated with these sophisticated ships require assigned personnel possess the highest personal suitability.
U
(3) (S) Recommendation A.3: Disapproved.
Rationale: Appropriate matters contained in the proposed demarche are being handled through ICAO channels.
(4) (U) Recommendation A.6: Disapproved.
SECRET
