(3) The data provided by NSWC Dahlgren also validates that, in fact, SPY radar was ducting, resulting in enhanced detection ranges.
5.Commercial Air
a. General
(1) Bandar Abbas International is a joint military/ commercial airfield.
(2) A total of 18 commercial air routes cross the Persian Gulf area covering at least 50% of the navigable waters.
(3) A total of 12 commercial air routes cross the southern Persian Gulf/Strait of Hormuz area alone. Specifically, 7 into or out of Dubai/Sharjah Terminal Control Area and 5 into or out of Abu Dhabi Terminal Control Area.
(4) Commerical air flights that do not approach Iran during any part of the flight or come from non-belligerent air space and are at the high altitudes normally flown by air carriers are relatively easy to identify.
(5) The width of the airway assigned to Iranian Air FLT 655 (A-59) was: 20NM (10NM either side of Centerline) from Bandar Abbas to reporting position DARAX and 10NM (5NM either side of center line) to Sharjah. Airway A-59 runs from an altitude of 4500 feet to infinity. The total length of the air route is 123NM.
(6) At least one thousand seven hundred and seventy-five commercial air flights passed through Oman Center for the week ending 13 July 1988.
(7) The only message traffic available to CJTFME on civilian airline schedules was the "FICPAC" message of 25 June 1988. That message was readdressed to all CJTFME units on 28 June 1988.
(8) The CJTFME's inchop brief discusses commercial air traffic in general but does not focus on any specific air routes or COMAIR schedules.
(9) CJTFME's inchop brief discusses the use of MAD (Military Air Distress). Moreover ships are told to use IAD (International Air Distress) to contact commercial aircraft and "unless you are up a regional ATC frequency, use IAD to try to contact ATC."
(10) The inchop brief alludes to the "very complex but ordered" commercial air picture. It cautions all units to be concerned with those air contacts which deviate from the normal pattern.
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