Page:Iran Air Flight 655 investigation.djvu/28

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page has been validated.

SECRET NOFORN

III. FINDINGS OF FACT

A.SETTING THE STAGE

1. Intelligence Background.

a. The Gulf War

(1) (U) The war between Iran and Iraq is the latest iteration of a conflict dating back a thousand years. (IO Exhibit 14, FICPAC GULF THREAT ORIENTATION).

(2) (U) Although Iraq used its superior Air Force to target Iranian oil installations around the head of the Gulf and Kharg Island early in the war, the purchase of EXOCET missiles from France in 1983 provided Iraq with a credible ship attack capability. Anti-shipping strikes commenced in 1984. (IO Exhibit 14, FICPAC GULF THREAT ORIENTATION).

(3) (U) Iraq’s intent on conducting anti-shipping attacks was to put economic pressure on Iran by seeking to limit Iran’s oil revenue and to bring an end to the larger ground war. Iran responded in kind by striking tankers in 1984 to prevent war supplies from reaching Iraq. (IO Exhibit 14, FICPAC GULF THREAT ORIENTATION).

(4) (U) Since the start of the Gulf War, as a subset of the larger Iran/Iraq War, there has been a history of violence in the Persian Gulf. ( , p.6).

U
(5) (SNF) The Gulf War intensified in 1987 when Iraq used its Air Force to conduct an aggressive campaign against Iranian oil facilities and shipping. The campaign was centered in the Central Persian Gulf (CPG) and intensified in May 1987, apparently reflecting an Iraqi decision to take greater risks to successfully strike Iranian shuttle tankers. These expanded operations culminated in the 17 May 1987 erroneous attack on USS STARK. (IO Exhibit 14, FICPAC GULF THREAT ORIENTATION).

(6) (U) The United States commenced escorting Kuwaiti reflagged tankers in 1987. ( , p. 6-7)

U
(7) (SNF) Iran viewed the escorting of merchant ships in the Gulf by the United States as provocative because it inhibited its ability to attack shipping in retaliation for Iraqi attacks on their facilities and shipping. (IO Exhibit 14, Intelligence Background Briefing).

U

(8) (SNF) In addition to its strikes against neutral shipping by aircraft, Iran conducted ship attacks with surface ships and small boats. Additionally, Iran also placed six moored mine fields across the Persian Gulf and in the Gulf of Oman in an

12

SECRET NOFORN