Page:Iran Air Flight 655 investigation.djvu/47

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(4) (U) The CO modified basic Battle Doctrine for PG Ops by placing the SITREP officer at OSDA #1 and International Air Distress (IAD) operator at LSD #1. He also placed the data recorder (CICO) directly behind LSD #2 and #3 to maintain a timeline of events. The CICO was in view of all large screens and could see "GW’s" CRO. (  p. 570).

(5) (U) On 3 Jul 88, USS VINCENNES’ primary AAW watch organization was as follows:


CO Capt Rogers
XO   (on the bridge)
TAO  
OSDA  
GW/FAAWC   (AT EC CONSOLE AT ADS)
CIC Officer   (NO CONSOLE) (WORKTABLE BEHIND "GW")
IAD Talker   (STAO CONSOLE AT ADS)
CSC  
TIC   (DSA/AAW C&R NET)
IDS  
SLQ-32  
EWS  
MSS  
ARC   (MAD TALKER)
AAWC  
ACS  

(IO Exhibit 174).

(6) (U) USS VINCENNES' enlisted general quarters CIC watchstanders for 3 JUL 1988 were PQS qualified for watches held that day (IO Exhibit 167, 170).

(7) (U) The Commanding Officer USS VINCENNES certified all officer watchstanders as qualified; however   had not completed PQS for AAWC (his 3 July 1988 GQ station). (IO Exhibits 151, 152,   p. 722).

U
(8) (S) The Commanding Officer USS VINCENNES stated his confidence level before and subsequent to the incident in   and   was the highest it could be. He also stated he had great faith in his "GW" organization and his CIC team’s experience. (Rogers p. 834 - 840).

c. Overall Combat System Status

(1) (U) USS VINCENNES' Preventive Maintenance System (PMS), which covers the AEGIS combat system, was recorded

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