Page:Iraqdossier.djvu/9

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      • developed mobile laboratories for military use, corroborating earlier reports about the mobile production of biological warfare agents;
      • pursued illegal programmes to procure controlled materials of potential use in the production of chemical and biological weapons programmes;
      • tried covertly to acquire technology and materials which could be used in the production of nuclear weapons;
      • sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa, despite having no active civil nuclear power programme that could require it;
      • recalled specialists to work on its nuclear programme;
      • illegally retained up to 20 al-Hussein missiles, with a range of 650km, capable of carrying chemical or biological warheads;
      • started deploying its al-Samoud liquid propellant missile, and has used the absence of weapons inspectors to work on extending its range to at least 200km, which is beyond the limit of 150km imposed by the United Nations;
      • started producing the solid-propellant Ababil-100, and is making efforts to extend its range to at least 200km, which is beyond the limit of 150km imposed by the United Nations;
      • constructed a new engine test stand for the development of missiles capable of reaching the UK Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus and NATO members (Greece and Turkey), as well as all Iraq’s Gulf neighbours and Israel;
      • pursued illegal programmes to procure materials for use in its illegal development of long range missiles;
      • learnt lessons from previous UN weapons inspections and has already begun to conceal sensitive equipment and documentation in advance of the return of inspectors.
  1. These judgements reflect the views of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). More details on the judgements and on the development of the JIC’s assessments since 1998 are set out in Part 1 of this paper.
  2. Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction are in breach of international law. Under a series of UN Security Council Resolutions Iraq is obliged to destroy its holdings of these weapons under the supervision of UN inspectors. Part 2 of the paper sets out the key UN Security Council Resolutions. It also summarises the history of the UN inspection regime and Iraq’s history of deception, intimidation and concealment in its dealings with the UN inspectors.
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