for the year 1552, but in 1556 the full numbers of the vanguard regiment did not bring it up to 1,500 horsemen. In 1578, in the campaign against Lithuania, the army, though increased by the presence of a Tartar contingent, only numbered 39,681 fighting men in all, made up as follows:
| Russian and Circassian Princes | 212 |
| Moscow boïars and boïars' sons | 9,200 |
| 'Men who served' from Novgorod and Iouriev | 1,109 |
| Tartars and Mordvians | 6,461 |
| Court Striéltsy | 2,000 |
| Striéltsy and Cossacks from the provinces | 13,119 |
| Possokha from the northern provinces | 7,580 |
| 39,681 |
Part of the available forces had probably been left to guard the frontier, while every boïar, on the other hand, took at least two ratniki, or fatigue men, with him, and some brought fifty or more.
One traveller of this period, Clement Adams, mentions 90,000 as the total number of men available for the Tsar's service, but adds that he only called out a third of these on his campaigns, being obliged to leave the other two-thirds to guard the fortified places. There is a striking agreement between this calculation and that furnished by the rosters for the year 1578.
Apart from the Striéltsy of the special corps and the possokha, all these troops were mounted. Their armament was of the most varied description. In Ivan's time, the curved Turkish sword and the bow were the favourite arms with most Russians. Only a few substituted pistols or long muskets. An axe hanging at the warrior's saddle-bow, a dagger, and now and then a lance, made up the campaigning equipment. Cuirasses were very little patronized. A few great lords wore them, and of very splendid make, out of vanity, and covered their heads with 'sallets' or 'morions.' There were no spurs—the whip supplied their place. The horseman held his bridle and his bow in his left hand, and clasped his sword and whip with his right. When he shot he dropped the sword and whip, both of which were fastened to a strap. The moment the enemy came within range every arrow flew at once, and, however much or little the adversary's onslaught were checked, the whole body of troops beat a retreat without awaiting the shock of battle. Thus it came about that this cavalry never learnt to stand in the open country against the Polish squadrons, which had been taught to charge right home. Its chief merits were its endurance and its extreme mobility. On
