Attn: Paul Sennott
of the proprietor to satisfy the notice requirement of the 1909 Act, we find no authority to support the extension of this liberalized standard to the circumstances of the notice in this case. The form of the name in the notice can be “either the owner’s true name, or an abbreviation by which such name can be recognized, or a generally known alternative designation of the owner.” Nimmer, supra, § 7.09[B], at 7-62. A number of the cases you have cited in support of your argument contain variations in the name of the proprietor of this kind. See Uneeda Doll Co. v. Goldfarb Novelty Co., 373 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1967) (holding that an abbreviation of the proprietor’s name satisfied the notice requirement); See also Tennessee Fabricating Co. v. Moultrie Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1970) (holding that an abbreviation of the proprietor’s name satisfied the notice requirement); See also, Gelles-Widmer Co. v. Milton Bradley Co., 313 F.2d 143 (7th Cir. 1963) (holding that the name of a subsidiary company which had identical officers and interests as the proprietor company satisfied the notice requirement). In all of these cases the name in the notice still served to identify the proprietor in a way that provided notice to the public of who was claiming copyright over the work.
While the term “proprietor” originally referred to the author of a work or to someone whom the author had assigned the rights to a work, later courts’ interpretation of the statute allowed the name of licensees to satisfy the notice requirement. Mifflin, 190 U.S. at 262. Goodis is one such example of this extension. In Goodis, the court held that “where a magazine has purchased the right of first publication under circumstances which show that the author has no intention to donate his work to the public, copyright notice in the magazine’s name is sufficient to obtain a valid copyright on behalf of the beneficial owner, the author or proprietor.” Id. at 399. While you argue that to deny Applicant copyright protection in this case would be to subject him to the “harsh results” that Goodis sought to avoid, the Board does not agree that Goodis extends to the facts of this case. The rationale behind the holding in Goodis was to do away with the doctrine of indivisibility of copyright, which rejected partial assignment of a copyright. The “harsh results” of which Goodis spoke occurred when a licensee of partial rights under a copyright lawfully published a work with a notice that did not include the name of the proprietor; when the doctrine of indivisibility was applied, the author or proprietor would have lost her right to copyright protection whether she intended to forfeit the work to the public domain or not. Goodis rectified this situation by allowing a copyright notice in the name of a licensee to shield the proprietor from forfeiture even though the licensee did not hold the entirety of the copyright.
Fantastic Fakes involved a case where a licensee published works with notices in the licensee’s name and not in the proprietor’s name. As stated above, any reference to the 1976 Act, including § 406(a), which is discussed in Fantastic Fakes and in your argument, is irrelevant to the Board’s analysis of whether the notice in the Book is sufficient to meet the statutory notice requirement under the 1909 Act.
The notice in the Book stating “Copyright © 1974 Peter Benchley” does not meet the statutory notice requirement as interpreted under the 1909 Act. Roger Kastel, the Applicant, is the proprietor of the Work. However, Peter Benchley is neither the name of the proprietor nor a name by which the proprietor is generally known. Furthermore, Peter Benchley is neither an assignee of the Work nor a licensee in the sense that the justification for cases like Goodis and Fantastic Fakes would permit Peter Benchley’s name to satisfy the notice requirement in order
