Cite as 349 Ark. 600 (2002)
targeted by the statute. Additionally, they allege that government officials in Arkansas have relied on the statute as both a tool and a justification for discriminatory actions against homosexuals.
[9, 10] Declaratory relief is the remedy sought by appellees in this case. Our statute on the right to a declaratory judgment states:
Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract, or other writings constituting a contract or whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract, or franchise may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract, or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder.
Ark. Code Ann. § 16-111-104 (1987) (emphasis added). While this section recognizes a party's right to a declaratory judgment, a justiciable controversy is required. Mastin v. Mastin, 316 Ark. 327, 871 S.W.2d 585 (1994). Regarding declaratory relief in general, this court has said that "declaratory relief will lie where (1) there is a justiciable controversy; (2) it exists between parties with adverse interests; (3) those seeking relief have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issues involved are ripe for decision." Donovan v. Priest, 326 Ark. 353, 359, 931 S.W.2d 119, 122 (1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1149 (1997) (citing U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Hill, 316 Ark. 251, 872 S.W.2d 349 (1994)). We have further stated: "The courts do not construe acts similar to said Act 274 [of 1953, known as the Declaratory Judgment Act,] to require actual litigation as a prerequisite to asking for a declaratory judgment, but they do state, as a general rule, that litigation must be pending or threatened." Jessup v. Carmichael, 224 Ark. 230, 232, 272 S.W.2d 438, 440 (1954). In Jessup, the plaintiff requested a declaratory judgment allowing her to make such use of her lot so as to prevent the defendant's surface water from flowing across it. Id. We held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a declaratory judgment where there was no guarantee that litigation would follow such use of her lot. Id. We reiterated that whether relief under the Act should be granted is a matter resting in sound, judicial discretion and specified that such relief ought not ordinarily be granted where another adequate remedy is at
