Page:Jegley v. Picado, 349 Ark. 600 (2002).pdf/48

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Ark.]
Jegley v. Picado
Cite as 349 Ark. 600 (2002)
647


allege harms which they may suffer, there is no allegation that these harms have occurred and no connection has been established between the possibility of the alleged harms and the existence of Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-122. First, appellees are concerned about a possible loss of housing. There is no allegation that the appellee fearing a loss of her lease has lost her lease. Second, appellees state a fear of loss of professional licenses, but cite no instances where this has occurred. Additionally, there is no showing that the appellee who contends that he failed to get a promotion because the statute is on the books actually suffered the harm of loss of employment. Third, appellees fear the loss of parental rights, and possible adverse actions taken by discriminatory police officers. While these feared consequences are dire, they have yet to occur. I would further note that appellees' allegations of harms focus primarily on a societal bias against their sexual preferences, but fail to establish that such bias results from the existence of Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-122. Because appellees have failed to establish that there is an actual threat of prosecution or that they have suffered actual harm resulting from the existence of the statute, I would conclude that they have not presented a justiciable controversy.

Because appellees have failed to establish a justiciable controversy, any opinion delivered by this court can only be advisory. It has been well settled that this court does not render advisory opinions nor answer academic questions. See, Saunders v. Neuse, 320 Ark. 547, 898 S.W.2d 43 (1995); Walker v. McCuen, 318 Ark. 508, 886 S.W.2d 577 (1994); Dougan v. Gray, 318 Ark. 6, 884 S.W.2d 239 (1994); Gladden v. Bucy, 299 Ark. 523, 772 S.W.2d 612 (1989); and Neeley v. Barber, 288 Ark. 384, 706 S.W.2d 358 (1986).

By embarking upon a path of writing advisory opinions declaring statues unconstitutional in a response to a petition for declaratory judgment without requiring that a justiciable controversy be presented, we step away from our responsibilities in the judicial branch and act as a super-legislative body with an assumed authority to correct mistakes that the court from time to time may believe have been made by our General Assembly.

I am authorized to state that Chief Justice ARNOLD joins in this dissent.