aim at mere literary dilettantism, cleverness of speech; that they direct the pupil's attention not to the thought but to form.[1] This is what they call "Jesuitical formalism." However, it is not Jesuitical at all. The above-cited questions certainly were directed towards the understanding of the thoughts of the authors. This method of questioning the pupils about the contents, the ideas of a literary work, was also eminently fitted to stimulate in the pupils self-activity and independent thinking. For this reason Quick's judgment on the Jesuit system is not correct, when he says that it "suppressed originality and independence of mind, love of truth for its own sake, the power of reflecting and of forming correct judgments."[2] Should he, however, take independence of thought in the sense now usually attached to it, as unrestrained rationalism which places private judgment above the teaching of the Bible and the whole deposit of Divine Revelation, then we admit that the Jesuits are opposed to this independence of thought; for it is the proud spirit of rebellion against God. Yet this is no longer an educational, but rather a philosophical and theological question, and those authors have unwarrantably dragged this discussion into their books on the history of educational methods.
We stated before that the linguistic training must always remain a more prominent part of the prelection than the antiquarian and other information. Here, however, another mistake must be avoided, which easily creeps into the teaching of the classics, a mistake which was not uncommon in the German schools
