reward, a means not at all immoral. For the desire of honor is inborn in man and lawful as long as it does not become inordinate.[1] Honest emulation is therefore lawful; it is also productive of great deeds. "In all the pursuits of active and speculative life, the emulation of states and individuals is the most powerful spring of the efforts and improvements of mankind." (Gibbon.)
In speaking of reward we do not mean necessarily prizes or premiums. These are indeed more open to objections. The jealousy of pupils is more easily aroused and sometimes even the dissatisfaction of parents. However, this can not justify the general condemnation of prizes. There is hardly an appointment made to any position of honor in a city or state, but a few disappointed individuals will feel and express their disapproval, no matter how just and fair the promotion has been. Should the appointment for such adverse criticism be omitted? Further, premiums for excellence in learning, in military valor, in political ability are as old as history. The Greeks rewarded the conqueror in their national games with a wreath; the Romans had various crowns for citizens who in different ways had deserved well of their country. And now-a-days no one objects if a victorious general or admiral is offered a token of public recognition, in the form of a precious sword, or even a more useful object. The soldiers of our generation are justly proud if their bravery is rewarded by a badge, and even the scholars of modern Europe, perhaps such as strongly denounce the corrupting influence of premi-
- ↑ See Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 2, 2, qu. 131 and 132: "On Ambition and Vain Glory."
