AGNOSTICISM: A Tliomas tion to
Agnates Agnosticism
THE JEWISH ENCYCLOPEDIA
237
II. till-
term invented by Prof. Hu.xicv in IHOit. cxpres.sive of opposicliiiins of the Christian gnostie as " tlio
one wild knows all about (!oil " (sec Ilti.xlcy in the Nincti-i-iiih CrnHn'y." Fchriiary. 1^>*'J)- in adaptation of Ihi- descriptive adjective found in .St. Paul's mention of tin' altar "to the iniknown (Joil " (Acts. xvii. 23). The word agnostic with its derivative has pas.sed into recent literature as the desiirnation in
the main of the theories of two jrroups of thinkers. In its oriirinal implication, correspondinj; to the positi<m of its inventor, the term airnostic npresented a state of suspended jud;;inent with rcirard both to theism and atheism. On the ground that e.istinii evidence does not justify either tliealtirmalion or the denial of tlw beinjt of God, and God is held to l)e unknown. Ilowever, Meaning, the word has assumed a secondary meaninir. It has come to denote the theory that God is not oidy now unknown, but is forever unknowable, on the assumption that the nature of liuman knowledire is such as to preclude knowledsje of ultimate thiiif^s. In the former sense the af^iKistie jiosition makes a reaction against the dogmatism of both the Church ami of atheistic materialism. Each jiresumed to pos.sess ultimate knowledge. A proti'st ajrainst the arroirant gnosis of these. Agnosticism reiiresents a wholesome phase of modern thoutrht. It is expressive of the recognized need of modesty and a liiifher degree of reverence. The dogmatism of till' Church was neither modest nor reverent; and these, its failings, marred also the attitude of itsantipode, insistent materialism. Not content to teach that God is. the Church proceeded to catjilogne what He is. In clainung for itself this knowledge, it ignored the linutations of hu-
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The Church
failed, furlliermore. in self consistency. It apof God. pealed to revelation, and thus conceded the positicm of those who insist upon the inability of human reason to arrive at a compre liensive knowledge of God. On the other hand, it ftssuined that the liuman min<l. lacking the insight to attain unto the knowledge of Gixl. may yet understand and interpret revelation, and proceeded to develop, from data beyond cognition, a theory of the Go<lliead and of (ic.d's relations to the world and every individual therein. This contradictiou pidve<l to be the vulnerable point which atheism was not slow
toatta<k, but atheism in turn fell into the errorof its antngonist. Hefusing toacknowledge Agnosti- reidity beyond the visible, tangible, cism versus and sensuous world, it contradicted itAtheism, self in buililiiig up a tla'ory of the universe which lraiiseende<l the data of immediate c.xperienee. Ilsdinials were as dogmatic as were the allirmations of Church theism. Agnosti eism. in proclaiming a truce to the verbalism of both eontestnnts. <ame upon the world of thought as a refreshing breeze after a hut aii<l stilling sirocco. As such a protest and reactinii. it helped to clarify the atmosphere ami eonlribiited to the reixamination of the foundations of belief It emphasized the necessity of clearer statements <if the basic propusitions at issue. Hut it could be only preliminary The metaphysical interest in man is toostri>ng to resign itself to inactivity, and the pas,sion for iniity and harmony is too insistently interwoven in the very constitution of the htunaii soul to respect the lines dniwn by this Agnosticism of "suspended judgment" in expect4iney of further anil fuller evidence. In its own development Agnosticism had to progress iH'yond itslirsi positions. Enunciating the doc
God is not only unknown, but forever unknowable, the later agnostic theories recur to the meta|)hysical epistemology of Kant and Comte. as modified in the synthetic philosophy of Herlwrt trine that
Fundamental to this jdiase of Agnostithe thesis that knowledge is conlined to phenomena that the nature of ultimate things lies beyond the reach of human thought. The radical defect of this contention has often been iiointed out. If it were true that our knowledge is limited to the phenomenal, by no possibility could we ever become aware of the limitation. To Develop- atlirm that things inthemselves exist, ment of but that man can not know them, imAgnosti- plies the contradiction of one half of cism. the propo.sition in the other. If we can not know things-in-themselves. how do we know that they exist? If we know that they exist, then they are not unknowable. The knowledge that they are includes in a certain degree also the knowledge of what they are. The argument which jiroves that we can not know what things are in themselves tells against the knowledge that they are. In the Kantian system the principle of causation is relied upon to prove the existence of the things in themselves. Hut. if our knowledge is confined within the realm of idienomena. this principle, of necessity, will apply only to phenomenal existence. can not take one step farther by the aid of this crutch. In knowing the limits, we have pa.ssed beyond them. This new Agnosticism controverts the position of the sensatiouists. It concedes that sensations must have a cause beyond them.selves. Our knowledge of the outer world is regarded as an inference, depending on an act of abstract thinking. It is then conceded that we know more than the immediate data of ex])erience, for sensjitions are the only states of cx|ierience. Yet we assume, on the principle of causation, the existence of a world beyond and antecedent to our sensations. In truth, the kiiowledge of sensations is not more direct than that of objects. To know consists not in the act of immediate experience, but is a composite opemtion in which comparison and memory that is to say, the conscious revivifying of experiences which have Conscious- passed away and are no mori play ness and considerable part. Self consciousness Knowl- as the basisof thought thus transcends edge. the actual as clearly as does the inference of tilings beyond the phenomenal. Rut this world, to which our sensjitions, as interpreted by consciousness, point, and the knowledge of which, though beyond experience, is ours, we inferiiret by the data of our own consciousness. projeel into the beyond our own personality. Our pei'sonal experience now, as Kant himself has pointed out, is in a certain sense out of and alMlve time, since the conscious unity which is present in it all. and without whi<-h it could not exist, is no member of the tem]iiinil series, but is that which makes the very conception of time possible. Our own self thus asserts itself as free from the limitiitions of time, and, therefore, it is not proved that the reality underlying the All must, of necessitv. 1h' ipiite uiiliki' what we know as human life. Vliat we know of self we may not deny to the absnlute. into Antiikopomoui-uism am> The fear of falling ANTiiiioiMiivM'msM is the fatal obsession of Agnosti cism but we think as men, and can not think otherMythopoetic construction is inherent in all wise. mental synthesis. .Science can not spare the privilege or resist the inclination. Any system of interpri'ting Spencer.
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