Page:John Adams - A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America Vol. I. (1787).djvu/156

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.
118
Ancient Republics, &c.

plies, by which they may be paid for their ſervices in executive offices, or even the public ſervice carried on to the detriment of the nation.

We have ſeen, both by reaſoning and in experience, what kind of equality is to be found or expected in the ſimpleſt people in the world. There is not a city nor a village, any more than a kingdom or commonwealth, in Europe or America; not a hord, clan, or tribe, among the negroes of Africa, or the ſavages of North or South America; nor a private club in the world, in which ſuch inequalities are not more or leſs viſible. There is then a certain degree of weight, in the public opinion and deliberations, which property, family, and merit will have: if Mr. Turgot had diſcovered a mode of aſecrtaining the quantity which they ought to have, and had revealed it to mankind, ſo that it might be known to every citizen, he would have deſerved more of their gratitude than all the inventions of philoſophers. But, as long as human nature ſhall have paſſions and imagination, there is too much reaſon to fear that theſe advantages, in many inſtances, will have more influence than reaſon and equity can juſtify.

Let us then reflect, how the ſingle aſſembly in the Maſſachuſett's, in which our great ſtateſman wiſhes all authority concentered, will be compoſed. There being no ſenate nor council, all the rich, the honourable, and meritorious, will ſtand candidates for ſeats in the houſe of repreſentatives, and nineteen in twenty of them obtain elections. The houſe will be found to have all the inequalities in it, that prevailed among the people at large. Such an aſſembly will be naturally divided into three parts.—The firſt is, of ſome great genius, ſome maſterly ſpirit, who unites in himſelf all

the