Page:John Adams - A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America Vol. I. (1787).djvu/158

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120
Ancient Republics, &c.

would be envy; becauſe there will be, among the ſecond claſs, ſeveral, whoſe fortunes, families, and merits, in the acknowledged judgment of all, approach near to the firſt; and, from the ordinary illuſions of ſelf-love and ſelf-intereſt, they and their friends will be much diſpoſed to claim the firſt place as their own right. This will introduce controverſy and debate, as well as emulation; and thoſe who wiſh for the firſt place, and cannot obtain it, will of courſe endeavour to keep down the ſpeaker as near upon a level with themſelves as poſſible, by paring away the dignity and importance of his office, as we ſaw in Venice, Poland, and every where elſe.

A ſingie aſſembly thus conſtituted, without any counterpoiſe, balance, or equilibrium, is to have all authority, legiſlative, executive, and judicial, concentered in it. It is to make a conſtitution and laws by its own will, execute thoſe laws at its pleaſure, and adjudge all controverſies, that ariſe concerning the meaning and application of them, at diſcretion. What is there to reſtrain them from making tyrannical laws, in order to execute them in a tyrannical manner?

Will it be pretended, that the jealouſy and vigilance of the people, and their power to diſcard them at the next election, will reſtrain them? Even this idea ſuppoſes a balance, an equilibrium, which Mr. Turgot holds in ſo much contempt; it ſuppoſes the people at large to be a check and controul to the repreſentative aſſembly. But this would be found a mere deluſion. A jealouſy between the electors and the elected neither ought to exiſt, nor is poſſible to exiſt. It is a contradiction to ſuppoſe, that a body of electors ſhould have at one moment a warm affection and entire confidence in a man, ſo as to intruſt him

with