occaſions in which they may ſtand in need of their favour, dare not reſiſt or oppoſe their will.
In like manner, they are not eaſily brought to obſtruct the deſigns of the conſuls, becauſe all of them in general, and every one in particular, become ſubject to their authority, when in the field.
Such being the power of each order to hurt and aſſiſt each other, their union is adapted to all contingencies, and it is impoſſible to invent a more perfect ſyſtem. When the common fear of a foreign enemy compels them to act in concert, ſuch is the ſtrength of the government, that nothing neceſſary is omitted, or comes too late, ſince all vie with each other in directing their thoughts to the public good, and their endeavours to carry their deſigns into execution. The commonwealth, from the peculiar frame of it, becomes irreſiſtibie, and attains whatever it propoſes.
When, in conſequence of victory, they live in proſperity and affluence, enjoying their good fortune free from the fear of a foreign enemy, they grow, through eaſe and flattery, inſolent and proud; their commonwealth is then chiefly obſerved to relieve itſelf: for when any branch of it becomes ambitious, and, ſwelling beyond its bounds, aims at unwarrantable power, being ſubject to the controul of the other two, it cannot run into any exceſs of power or arrogance; but all three muſt remain in the terms preſcribed by the conſtitution.
Thus, my dear Sir, you ſee that Polybius's opinion of different orders, checks, and balances, in a commonwealth, is very different from that of Mr. Turgot. The Roman conſtitution formed the nobleſt people, and the greateſt power, that has ever exiſted. But if all the powers of the
