Page:John Banks Wilson - Maneuver and Firepower (1998).djvu/327

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.
A NEW DIRECTION—FLEXIBLE RESPONSE
305

authorized an additional 1,000 troops. The troop increase permitted the complete mechanization of the divisions with additional armored personnel carriers. The readiness of the Strategic Army Force was increased in the United States and the training base was expanded, eliminating the basic training mission in combat divisions.[1]

In the summer of 1961 Congress also authorized the Defense Department to order 250,000 reservists (individuals as well as those in units) to active duty for twelve months. The subsequent closing of the Berlin border on 13 August 1961 sparked another series of mobilization measures. In October the Army Reserve's 100th Division (Training) was ordered to active military duty to open the training center at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas. That same month the Kennedy administration approved the deployment of two additional combat divisions to the European command. Two National Guard divisions were federalized in October to replace the divisions programmed to be deployed from the strategic force, bringing the total number of divisions on active duty to sixteen. The 32d Infantry Division (Wisconsin) was sent to Fort Polk, Louisiana, and the 49th Armored Division (Texas) reported to Fort Hood, Texas. In all, 113,254 officers and enlisted men of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve were ordered into active military service.[2]

During the crisis no division deployed to Germany, but during the next few months the Army took other steps to strengthen its forces in Europe. Measures included equipping the troops with new M14 rifles and M60 machine guns and accelerating production of M60 main battle tanks and M113 armored personnel carriers, actions that permitted the Army to field those systems earlier than planned. To shorten the time required to move units to Europe, the Army positioned sufficient materiel in Germany to equip one armored division, one infantry division, and several nondivisional battalions. To maintain the equipment, personnel from the 2d Armored and 4th Infantry Divisions moved to Germany, but eventually permanent caretaker units replaced these men, Shortly after the equipment was placed in Germany, the Army launched Operation Big Lift, with units from the United States traveling to Europe and conducting exercises with the stockpiled equipment, a precursor of similar exercises that were soon to become a regular fixture in the Army.[3]

The Army also increased combat readiness in other commands. It replaced the cumbersome Honest Johns with Little Johns in the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions and 4th and 25th Infantry Divisions, a step directed toward improving the ability to move these units by air. The 25th Infantry Division was brought to full strength in Hawaii, and the reinforced airborne battle group that had been sent to Okinawa in June 1960 was relieved from assignment to the division but remained in Okinawa. In Korea the strength of two divisions was also increased.[4]

Following the call-up of the reserves for the Berlin crisis, Congress authorized a modest permanent increase in the strength of the Regular Army, and in January 1962 Secretary McNamara approved the activation of the first two

  1. Robert W. Coakley, Walter G. Hermes, James F. Schnabel, and Earl F. Ziemke, "U.S. Army Expansion and Readiness, 1961–1962." Ms, ch. 11, DAMH-HSR, The Strategic Army Force (STRAF) was comprised of units to provide a mobilization expansion base, a source of trained units and replacements to support forces deployed overseas, and a combat-ready element designed to serve as a readily available force for use wherever needed,
  2. Ibid.; Executive Order 10957, DA Bull 5, 1961; Department of the Army, Forces in Depth, "One Army" in Action, 1961–1962 (Washington, D.C.: n.p., 1962) (hereafter cited as "One Army" in Action).
  3. Forest K. Kleinman, "Front and Center: The Changing Army." Army 12 (Feb 1962): 16; Department of Defense Annual Report, FY 1962, pp. 100, 110, 113; Public Affairs Division, Big Lift 1963 (U.S. Army, Europe, 1963).
  4. Kleinman, "Front and Center," pp. 17–18; Ltr, TAG to CGs, Third and Sixth Armies, and Chief of Engineers, 28 Nov 61, sub: Reorganization of Units, AGAO-O (M) 322 (6 Nov 61) DCSPER, Lir, TAG to CG, Third U.S. Amy, 27 Feb 62, sub: Reorganization of the 82d Airborne Division, AGAO (M) 322 (16 Feb 62) DCSPER, Ltr, TAG to CinC, USARPAC, 14 Jun 61, sub: Change in Status of Units, AGAO-O (M) 322 (2 Jun 61) DCSPER, Ltr, TAG to CinC, USARPAC, 27 Mar 62, sub: Change in Status of Units, AGAO-O (M) 322 (14 Mar 62) DCSPER, and Ltr, TAG to CG, Sixth U.S. Army, L5 Feb 62, sub: Reorganization of the 4th Infantry Division, AGAO-O (M) 322 (15 Feb 62) DCSPER, all AG Reference files, Historical Data Cards, Divisions, DAMH-HSO.