An image should appear at this position in the text.General Wickhamrized for the support command, which raised the division's strength to 10,791 (Chart 47). All men and their equipment were transportable in fewer than 550 C–141 sorties in less than four days, a key feature in Wickham's guidance for the design of the light division.33
The light division greatly improved the ratio of combat troops to support personnel. Infantry battalions fielded three rifle companies and a headquarters company, a total of 559 officers and enlisted men. The battalion headquarters company included a "footmobile" reconnaissance platoon (no vehicles in it), an antiarmor platoon (four TOW launchers), and a heavy mortar platoon (four 4.2-inch mortars), The only vehicles in the battalions were the new "high mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicles" (HMMWVs, or "Hummers") and motorcycles. Brigades provided mess and maintenance for battalions. The division artillery consisted of three towed 105-mm. howitzer battalions, three batteries with six howitzers each and one battery of 155-mm. howitzers fielding eight pieces, A command aviation company, an attack helicopter battalion, and the reconnaissance squadron comprised the aviation brigade. The air defense artillery battalion fielded 20-mm. multibarrel, electrically driven Vulcan guns and the Stinger missiles fired from a shoulder position, and the engineer battalion had no bridging equipment. Support elements followed the functional ideas of ROAD, with the division having a maintenance battalion, a supply and transport battalion, a medical battalion, and a transportation aircraft maintenance company, along with the command headquarters and materiel management center. Support troops totaled about 1,300 men.34
The light division met several needs of the Army, It cost less and was simpler to maintain and support than the heavy infantry division. It was well suited for rear area operations if provided with air and ground transport and could easily adapt to urban operations, heavily forested or rugged areas, and adverse weather conditions—all circumstances found in Western Europe, Easily deployed, the division enhanced the Army’s strategic response options. The division's weaknesses included lack of organic ground and air transport and an inability to face heavy forces in open terrain because it lacked armor. Also, the division was vulnerable to heavy artillery, nuclear, and chemical attacks and had only minimal