effect to the instructions received by him. The gradual failure of his efforts, which were foredoomed by the untimely battle of Jamrúd, but which continued in spite of that complication, has been traced; their final issue in the withdrawal of Burnes has been described. The erection of a 'rampart' on the North-West frontier of India has been shown to have been Lord Auckland's policy. When the Amír refused to have a hand in it, the measures consequent on his attitude have been narrated. It has been seen that Ranjít Singh would not accept the burden of invading Kábul; and that no confidence was felt in Sháh Shujá's capacity to levy within sufficient time the troops necessary to that end, or to lead them to success when raised. But the treaty had been signed. At Herát, in India, in Afghánistán, were grounds for urgency. From the political as well as the military point of view, a decision must be taken. No further light could be looked for from London or Teherán. No aid apparently could be hoped for from England. The responsibility had been laid by the home authorities on India alone of combating the 'extension of Persian dominion and the encroachments of Russian influence.' The day had arrived when, though Lord Auckland would gladly have paused, that responsibility compelled a decision.
This is not a history of the first Afghán war. That event is dealt with in these pages, only so far as is necessary for the purpose of this Memoir. If, in exposing the trivial point of view which would
