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request, among other things, appointment of a special master to investigate their claims of election irregularities and fraud and to “independently review the election procedures employed at the TCF Center and throughout the State,”[1] presumably pursuant to Const 1963, art 2, § 4(1)(h)—which was among the provisions added to the Michigan Constitution by Proposal 3 and which guarantees to “[e]very citizen of the United States who is an elector qualified to vote in Michigan … [t]he right to have the results of statewide elections audited, in such manner as prescribed by law, to ensure the accuracy and integrity of elections.”
Based on the pleadings alone, a majority of the Court today denies petitioners’ requested relief through a short form order of denial that concludes the majority “is not persuaded that it can or should grant the requested relief.” I dissent from the summary dismissal of petitioners’ action, without ordering immediate oral argument and additional briefing. As pointed out in the statements of my colleagues, there are threshold questions that must be answered before addressing the substantive merits of petitioners’ claims. But rather than summarily dismissing this action because procedural questions exist, I would have ordered immediate oral argument and briefing to address these threshold questions, as well as the meaning and scope of implementation of Const 1963, art 2, § 4(1)(h).
The matter before us is an original action asking the Court to invoke the power of mandamus, superintending control, and other extraordinary writs to provide declaratory relief. As such, this matter should be distinguished from a typical application seeking leave to appeal from the Court of Appeals. Original actions are limited to a small class of cases particularly described in Const 1963, art 6, § 4. Original actions should, therefore, be afforded very close review, particularly when they raise matters under Michigan election law.
Here, petitioners have presented a significant constitutional question pertaining to the process and scope of the constitutional right to an election audit—a right explicitly placed in our Constitution by the people themselves, in whom “[a]ll political power is
- ↑ Petition for Extraordinary Writs & Declaratory Relief, p 53.
Moreover, it would be strange to suggest that MCL 168.479(1) applies only to initiatives and referenda, as precisely that sort of limiting language is found not in MCL 168.479(1) but, rather, MCL 168.479(2), which provides in relevant part that any person who “feels aggrieved by any determination made by the board of state canvassers regarding the sufficiency or insufficiency of an initiative petition … .” (emphasis added). Therefore, on the basis of the statutory text, I am not nearly as confident as Justice Clement that MCL 168.479(1) does not confer jurisdiction in this Court to hear petitioners’ challenge. But to the extent we have questions about the Court’s jurisdiction, I would explore them at oral argument.
