rules and regulations concerning territory, has been construed to mean a power to erect a government. A power to regulate trade is a power to make all needful rules and regulations concerning trade. Why may it not, then, include that of erecting a trading company, as well as in other cases to erect a government?
"It is remarkable, that the state conventions, who have proposed amendments in relation to this point, have most, if not all of them, expressed themselves nearly thus: Congress shall not grant monopolies, nor erect any company with exclusive advantages of commerce! Thus at the same time expressing their sense, that the power to erect trading companies, or corporations, was inherent in congress, and objecting to it no further, than as to the grant of exclusive privileges. The secretary entertains all the doubts, which prevail concerning the utility of such companies; but he cannot fashion to his own mind a reason to induce a doubt, that there is a constitutional authority in the United States to establish them. If such a reason were demanded, none could be given, unless it were this—that congress cannot erect a corporation; which would be no better, than to say, they cannot do it because they cannot do it. First, presuming an inability without reason, and then assigning that inability, as the cause of itself Illustrations of this kind might be multiplied without end. They will, however, be pursued no further.
"There is a sort of evidence on this point, arising from an aggregate view of the constitution, which is of no inconsiderable weight. The very general power of laying and collecting taxes, and appropriating their proceeds; that of borrowing money indefinitely; that of coining money and regulating foreign coins; that of making all needful rules and regulations respecting the property of the United States;—these powers combined, as well as the reason and nature of the thing, speak strongly this language; that it is the manifest design and scope of the constitution to vest in congress all the powers requisite to the effectual administration of the finances of the United States. As far as concerns this object, there appears to be no parsimony of power. To suppose, then, that the government is precluded from the employment of so usual, and so important an instrument for the administration of its finances, as that of a bank, is to suppose, what does not coincide with the general tenour and complexion of the constitution, and what is not agreeable to impressions, that any mere spectator would entertain concerning it. Little less, than a prohibitory clause, can destroy the strong presumptions, which result from the general aspect of the government. Nothing but demonstration should exclude the idea, that the power exists.
vol. iii.19
