of them; and others, which enter into some, and are excluded in others.
§ 1374. It seems agreed, that, when the obligation of contracts is spoken of in the constitution, we are to understand, not the mere moral, but the legal obligation of contracts. The moral obligation of contracts is, so far as human society is concerned, of an imperfect kind, which the parties are left free to obey or not, as they please. It is addressed to the conscience of the parties, under the solemn admonitions of accountability to the Supreme Being. No human lawgiver can either impair, or reach it. The constitution has not in contemplation any such obligations, but such only, as might be impaired by a state, if not prohibited.[1] It is the civil obligation of contracts, which it is designed to reach, that is, the obligation, which is recognised by, and results from the law of the state, in which it is made. If, therefore, a contract, when made, is by the law of the place declared to be illegal, or deemed to be a nullity, or a nude pact, it has no civil obligation, because the law in such cases forbids its having any binding efficacy, or force. It confers no legal right on the one party, and no correspondent legal duty on the other. There is no means allowed, or recognised to enforce it; for the maxim is, ex nudo pacto non oritur actio. But when it does not fall within the predicament of being either illegal, or void, its obligatory force is coextensive with its stipulations.
§ 1375. Nor is this obligatory force so much the result of the positive declarations of the municipal law, as of the general principles of natural, or (as it is some-- ↑ Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheaton's R. 257, 258, 280, 281, 300, 316 to 318, 337, 338.
