pairing of the obligation of such contract.[1] But every change and modification of the remedy does not involve such a consequence. No one will doubt, that the legislature may vary the nature and extent of remedies, so always, that some substantive remedy be in fact left. Nor can it be doubted, that the legislature may prescribe the times and modes, in which remedies may be pursued; and bar suits not brought within such periods, and not pursued in such modes. Statutes of limitations are of this nature; and have never been supposed to destroy the obligation of contracts, but to prescribe the times, within which that obligation shall be enforced by a suit; and in default to deem it either satisfied, or abandoned.[2] The obligation to perform a contract is coeval with the undertaking to perform it. It originates with the contract itself, and operates anterior to the time of performance. The remedy acts upon the broken contract, and enforces a pre-existing obligation.[3] And a state legislature may discharge a party from imprisonment upon a judgment in a civil case of contract, without infringing the constitution; for this is but a modification of the remedy, and does not impair the obligation of the contract.[4] So, if a party should be in gaol, and give a bond for the prison liberties, and to remain a true prisoner, until lawfully discharged, a subsequent discharge by an act of the legislature would not impair the contract; for it would be a lawful dischar2;e in the sense of the bond.[5]
- ↑ Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. R. 284, 285, 327, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353; Sturgis v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. R. 200, 201, 207.
- ↑ Sturgis v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. R. 200, 206, 207; Mason v. Haile, 12 Wheat. R. 370 380, 381; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. R. 262, 263, 349, 350; Hawkins v. Barney's Lessee, 5 Peters's Sup. R. 457.
- ↑ Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. R. 349, 350.
- ↑ Mason v. Haile, 12 Wheat. R. 370.
- ↑ Id.
