266
CONSTITUTION OF THE U. STATES.
[BOOK III.
constitutionally possesses authority to dissolve that contract against the will, and without the default of either party. This point, however, may well be left for more exact consideration, until it becomes the very ground of the lis mota.[1]
§ 1392. Before quitting this subject it may be proper to remark, that as the prohibition, respecting ex post facto laws, applies only to criminal cases; and the other is confined to impairing the obligation of contracts; there are many laws of a retrospective character, which may yet be constitutionally passed by the state legislatures, however unjust, oppressive, or impolitic they may be.[2] Retrospective laws are, indeed, generally unjust; and, as has been forcibly said, neither accord with sound legislation, nor with the fundamental principles of the social compact.[3] Still they are, with the exceptions above stated, left open to the states, according to their own constitutions of government; and become obligatory, if not prohibited by the latter. Thus, for instance, where the legislature of Connecticut, in 1795, passed a resolve, setting aside a decree of a court of probate disapproving of a will, and granted a new hearing; it was held, that the resolve, not being against any constitutional principle in that state, was valid; and that the will, which was approved upon the new hearing, was conclusive, as to the rights obtained under it.[4] There is nothing in the constitution of the United States, which forbids a state legislature from exercising- ↑ Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. R. 629, 695, 696.
- ↑ See Beach v. Woodhull, 1 Peters's Cir. Ct. R. 2; Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. R. 386; Satterlee v. Mathewson, 2 Peters's Sup. R. 380; Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Peters's Sup. R. 627, 661.
- ↑ Patterson J. in Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. R. 397.
- ↑ Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. R. 386.
