§ 1421. The case of the king of Great Britain is adduced, as a proof the other way; but it is a case wholly inapplicable to the circumstances of our republic. In Great Britain there is an hereditary magistrate; and it is a settled maxim in that government, that he can do no wrong; the true meaning of which is, that, for the sake of the public peace, he shall not be accountable for his administration of public affairs, and his person shall be sacred. In that kingdom it is, therefore, wise, that he should have a constitutional council, at once to advise him in regard to measures, and to become responsible for those measures. In no other way could any responsibility be brought home to the executive department. Still the king is not bound by the advice of his council. He is the absolute master of his own conduct; and the only alternative left to the ministry is, to compel him to follow their advice, or to resign the administration of the government. In the American republic the case is wholly different. The executive magistrate is chosen by, and made responsible to, the people; and, therefore, it is most fit, that he should have the exclusive management of the affairs, for which he is thus made responsible. In short, the reason for a council in Great Britain is the very reason for rejecting it in America. The object, in such case, is to secure executive energy and responsibility. In Great Britain it is secured by a council. In America it would be defeated by one.[1]
§ 1422. The idea of a council to the executive, which has prevailed to so great an extent in the state constitutions, has, without doubt, been derived from that- ↑ The Federalist, No. 70. See Rawle on Const. ch. 12, p. 147 to 150; North Amer. Review, Oct. 1827, p. 264, 265.
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