inconvenience of such frequently recurring elections of the chief magistrate, by generating factions, combining intrigues, and agitating the public mind, seems not hitherto to have attracted as much attention, as it deserves. One of two evils may possibly occur from this source; either a constant state of excitement, which will prevent the fair operation of the measures of an administration; or a growing indifference to the election, both on the part of candidates and the people, which will surrender it practically into the hands of the selfish, the office-seekers, and the unprincipled devotees of power. It has been justly remarked by Mr. Chancellor Kent, that the election of a supreme executive magistrate for a whole nation affects so many interests, addresses itself so strongly to popular passions, and holds out such powerful temptations to ambition, that it necessarily becomes a strong trial to public virtue, and even hazardous to the public tranquility.[1]
§ 1444. The remaining part of the clause respects the Vice-President. If such an officer was to be created, it is plain, that the duration of his office should be co-extensive with that of the president. Indeed, as we shall immediately see, the scheme of the government necessarily embraced it; for when it was decided, that two persons were to be voted for, as president, it was decided, that he, who had the greatest number of- ↑ 1 Kent's Comm. Lect. 13, p. 257.
should be elected for seven years, and be ineligible afterwards. This term I thought sufficient to enable him, with the concurrence of the legislature, to carry through and establish any system of improvement he should propose for the general good. But the practice adopted, I think, is better, allowing his continuance for eight years, with a liability to be dropped at halfway of the term, making that a period of probation." 1 Jefferson's Corresp. 64, 65. See also 1 Tucker's Black. Comm. App. 328, 329.
