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CONSTITUTION OF THE U. STATES.
[BOOK III.
Page:Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (1st ed, 1833, vol III).djvu/322
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operate in the choice of the person, to whom so important a trust was confided. This would be accomplished much more perfectly by committing the right of choice to persons, selected for that sole purpose at the particular conjuncture, instead of persons, selected for the general purposes of legislation.[1] Another motive was, to escape from those intrigues and cabals, which would be promoted in the legislative body by artful and designing men, long before the period of the choice, with a view to accomplish their own selfish purposes.[2] The very circumstance, that the body entrusted with the power, was chosen long before the presidential election, and for other general functions, would facilitate every plan to corrupt, or manage them. It would be in the power of an ambitious candidate, by holding out the rewards of office, or other sources of patronage and honour, silently, but irresistibly to influence a majority of votes; and thus, by his own bold and unprincipled conduct, to secure a choice, to the exclusion of the highest, and purest, and most enlightened men in the country. Besides; the very circumstance of the possession of the elective power would mingle itself with all the ordinary measures of legislation. Compromises and bargains would be made, and laws passed, to gratify particular members, or conciliate particular interests; and thus a disastrous influence would be shed over the whole policy of the government. The president would, in fact, become the mere tool of the dominant party in congress; and would, before he occupied the seat, be bound down to an entire subserviency to their views.[3] No measure would be adopted, which
