Page:Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (1st ed, 1833, vol III).djvu/331

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CH. XXXVI.]
EXECUTIVE—CHOICE OF PRESIDENT.
323

of Mr. Jefferson over his competitor, Mr. Burr, in 1801, which threatened a dissolution of the government,[1] and put the issue upon the tried patriotism of one or two individuals, who yielded from a sense of duty their preference of the candidate, generally supported by their friends.[2]

§ 1459. Struck with these difficulties, it has been a favourite opinion of many distinguished statesmen, especially of late years, that the choice ought to be directly by the people in representative districts, a measure, which, it has been supposed, would at once facilitate a choice by the people in the first instance, and interpose an insuperable barrier to any general corruption or intrigue in the election. Hitherto this plan has not possessed extensive public favour. Its merits are proper for discussion elsewhere, and do not belong to these Commentaries.

§ 1460. The issue of the contest of 1801 gave rise
  1. 1 Kent's Comm. Lect. 13, p. 262.
  2. Allusion is here especially made to the late Mr. Bayard, who held the vote of Delaware, and who, by his final vote in favour of Mr. Jefferson, decided the election. It was remarked at the time, that in the election of Mr. Jefferson, in 1801, the votes of two or three states were held by persons, who soon afterwards received office from him. The circumstance is spoken of in positive terms by Mr. Bayard, in his celebrated Speech on the Judiciary, in 1802.[a 1] Mr. Bayard did not make it matter of accusation against Mr. Jefferson, as founded in corrupt bargaining. Nor has any such charge been subsequently made. The fact is here stated merely to show, how peculiarly delicate the exercise of such functions necessarily is; and how difficult it may be, even for the most exalted and pure executive, to escape suspicion or reproach, when he is not chosen directly by the people. Similar suggestions will scarcely ever fail of being made, whenever a distinguished representative obtains office after an election of president, to which he has contributed. The learned editor of Blackstone's Commentaries has spoken with exceeding zeal of the dangers arising from the intrigues and cabals of an election by the house of representatives, 1 Tucker's Black. Comm. App. 327.
  1. Debates on the Judiciary, printed by Whitney & Co., Albany, 1802, p. 418, 419.